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Abstract 
South Africa’s 40 years of experience with capital controls on residents and non-residents (1961-2001) 
reads like a collection of examples of perverse unanticipated effects of legislation and regulation. We 
show that the presence of capital controls on residents and non-residents, enabled the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) to target domestic interest rates (and or the exchange rate) via interventions in
the (commercial) foreign exchange market. This provides an early rationale for anchoring SA monetary
policy via the exchange rate, rather than via domestic interest rates. This suggests not only that the
capital controls themselves exhibited substantial institutional inertia, but that this same institutional 
inertia also applied to the monetary policy regime. A plausible reason  for this is that for most of the
20th century in South Africa (partial) capital controls and exchange rate based monetary policies were
like Siamese twins; almost impossible to separate.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004), the debate regarding the use of capital 
controls has a long history, and tends to be revived with each new round of crises. 
This has indeed been the case in recent years. Events in East-Asia in 1997-98 appear 
to have softened attitudes towards the use of controls on capital flows, which had 
turned negative since the 1980s.  
 
In this paper our focus is firmly on South Africa and its 40 odd years of experience 
with capital controls. Here we build on important previous work published under the 
aegis of the South African Reserve Bank by Farrell (2001) and Farrell and Todani 
(2004). The approach that we follow is both historical and analytical. The latter 
implies the use throughout this paper of some simple international arbitrage 
conditions building on previous work by Huizinga (1996). The use of the analytical 
framework enables us to foucus more clearly on the place of capital controls in the 
overall monetary policy mix.  
 
Huizinga (1996) makes the general point that multiple exchange rate practices, or 
generally any official selling or buying of foreign exchange at a rate different from the 
‘equilibrium’ rate, have long been recognized to be quasi-fiscal activities as they 
immediately impact on the public finances. In fact, multiple exchange rate systems 
can be interpreted as a set of separate taxes on international capital flows and goods 
trade. He investigates the taxation of residents implicit in South Africa’s dual 
exchange rate system between 1973 and 1995 and finds that South Africa seems to 
have subsidized capital inflows, with negative return implications of around 1 percent 
of GDP a year. In addition, he finds that the South African government achieved 
substantial debt service savings that seemed to have outweighed the costs of 
subsidized international lending.  
 
Huizinga assumes that South Africa’s two-tiered exchange system that was in place 
from the sixties till 1995 (with the exception of a short-lived period of exchange 
market unification from February 1983 to August 1995) was an example of a 
straightforward two-tier exchange rate system that channeled all current account 
transactions through the commercial rand market and all capital account transactions 
through the financial market. However, the reality of the system was more 
complicated. For example, according to the financial rand system that was in place 
between January 1979 and February 1983 and between September 1985 and February 
1995 all loan funds were to be transferred via the commercial market (that is the 
capital as well as the interest payments which would usually have been included in the 
current account).  
 
In this paper we allow for more historical detail with respect to the mechanics and 
historical evolution of South Africa’s dual exchange rate system. In addition we show 
how this system was the unintended consequence of the imposition by the SA 
authorities of controls on capital outflows by non-residents in 1961 (following the 
events associated with Sharpeville), with the aim of protecting SA’s gold and foreign 
exchange reserves reserves.  
 
As pointed out by Rob Norton, the law of unintended consequences, often cited but 
rarely defined, is that actions of people—and especially of government—always have 
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effects that are unanticipated or "unintended."1 Economists and other social scientists 
have heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and popular opinion 
have largely ignored it. The concept of unintended consequences is one of the 
building blocks of economics. Adam Smith's "invisible hand," the most famous 
metaphor in social science, is an example of a positive unintended consequence. Most 
often, however, the law of unintended consequences illuminates the perverse 
unanticipated effects of legislation and regulation.2  
 
South Africa’s 40 years of experience with capital controls on residents and non-
residents (1961-2001) reads like a collection of examples of perverse unanticipated 
effects of legislation and regulation. Of course, those unintended consequences can 
add so much to the costs of those policies that they make the policies unwise even if 
they achieve their stated goals. Further we show that the presence of capital controls 
on residents and non-residents, enabled the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) to 
target domestic interest rates (and or the exchange rate) via interventions in the 
(commercial) foreign exchange market. This provides an early rationale for anchoring 
SA monetary policy via the exchange rate, rather than via domestic interest rates. This 
suggests not only that the capital controls themselves exhibited substantial 
institutional inertia, but that this same institutional inertia also applied to the monetary 
policy regime. A plausible reason  for this is that for most of the 20th century in South 
Africa (partial) capital controls and exchange rate based monetary policies were like 
Siamese twins; almost impossible to separate.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses and assesses 
the blocked rand system. The securities and financial rand systems follow in Sections 
3, 4 and 5. Section 6 analyzes the abolishment of the financial rand system and the 
associated further relaxation of exchange controls Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.1 THE BLOCKED RAND SYSTEM 
 
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976, pp 84-85), the blocked rand system was largely 
based on the measures taken in 1961 following Sharpeville which led to a 
considerable outflow of capital funds and a serious decline in the gold and foreign 
exchange reserves.3 Stricter overall control – on an administrative/direct basis - over 
capital transfers from South Africa was introduced with the aim of providing more 
effective protection for the foreign reserves at the same time reducing the danger of a 
threat to internal growth and stability by monetary developments transmitted through 
the balance of payments. 
                                                 
1Rob Norton is a columnist for eCompany Now magazine and was previously the economics editor of 
Fortune magazine. The quoted document is available on 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html#biography. 
2 In 1692 John Locke, the English philosopher and a forerunner of modern economists, urged the 
defeat of a parliamentary bill designed to cut the maximum permissible rate of interest from 6 percent 
to 4 percent. Locke argued that instead of benefiting borrowers, as intended, it would hurt them. People 
would find ways to circumvent the law, with the costs of circumvention borne by borrowers. To the 
extent the law was obeyed, Locke concluded, the chief results would be less available credit and a 
redistribution of income away from "widows, orphans and all those who have their estates in money."  
3 Note the similarity of policy responses between the Sharpeville and 1985 debt crisis situations. In 
both cases stricter controls on capital transfers from South Africa were imposed as a (intitailly 
temporary) crisis-measures to stem outflows.  
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The most important measure taken at the time concerned the introduction of 
restrictions on the repatriation of funds previously invested in South Africa by non-
residents (foreigners). Thus, apart from the prohibition on South Africans (residents) 
transferring funds abroad, foreigners found that although they could still sell local 
securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), in terms of the Exchange 
Control Regulations introduced in 1961 the proceeds of sales of South African assets4 
by non-residents were blocked within South Africa, and deposited in blocked rand 
accounts in the name of the foreigner at a commercial bank. The funds so deposited 
were called ‘blocked rand’.5 [Farrell and Todani (2004), hereafter FT and Gidlow 
(1976)]. 
 
To illustrate how the mechanism worked, consider the following example. 
Specifically, let te be the commercial (official) exchange rate (expressed as rand per 
dollar) in period t (t = 1, 2).  
 
Suppose a non-resident investor owns R 1000 worth (25 X R40) of De Beers shares in 
period 1, and would like to disinvest from the JSE in period 2. Without any controls 
on outflows, this would lead to transactions 1 and 2 below. 
 
Non-resident portfolio in period 1 
  
De Beers (25 X R 40)                           R 1000
 
 
 
Transaction 1: Non-resident disinvests from JSE in period 2 
De Beers            -R 1000 
 
 
Rand            + R 1000  
 
Transaction 2: Non-resident sells rand for dollars on FX market in period 2 
Rand              - R 1000 
 
 
US$                                             +1000* 





2
1
e
 
 
 
However, under the blocked rand system, transaction 2 does not materialize. The rand 
balance under 1 was deposited in blocked rand accounts with commercial banks and 
thus became blocked rand. However, the balances could be repatriated under certain 
circumstances. Those are investigated later. 
 
This means that notional demand for dollars (and supply of rand) did not materialize 
on the commercial market for rand. Thus, the official (commercial) exchange rate of 
the rand was insulated from selling pressures that would be initiated by non-residents 
selling SA securities, and was therefore most likely to be substantially overvalued 
with respect to the hypothetical level of the exchange rate in the absence of 
aforementioned controls.  
                                                 
4 Quoted or unquoted shares, gilts, semi-gilts or property [Farell and Todani (2004, p. 19)]. 
5 Gidlow (1976) points out that blocked rand balances were principally held by non-resident brokers, 
financial institutions and individuals who, although living abroad, had left money in South Africa. 
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Using FLOATte  for the corresponding (counterfactual) equilibrium exchange rate under 
a clean float (in the absence of capital controls), then we have  
 
FLOATee 22 <           (1) 
 
indicating that the (counterfactual) equilibrium rate would be trading at a discount vis-
à-vis the official rate, i.e. that the commercial rate is overvalued.  
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, pp 5-6), the blocked rand balances could only be 
repatriated under certain circumstances; in general 
 
(i) non-residents could use blocked rand to purchase shares quoted on the 
JSE, which could be endorsed, exported and sold outside the country, say, 
in London (and if the new non-resident owner of the shares sold them in 
South Africa, blocked rand were again created). 
(ii) the non-resident could use the blocked rand to purchase government, 
municipial and public utility stocks with a maturity of five years or more. 
Once these had been held for at least five years, they could be repatriated 
at the official (commercial) exchange rate. 
(iii) the non-resident could use the blocked rand to take up special non-resident 
bonds with five year maturities issued by the government. These could 
again by repatriated at the official (commercial) exchange rate on maturity. 
 
Therefore, as pointed out by Gidlow (1976, p. 85), blocked rand has therefore been 
eligible for investment only in particular types of South African securities; it has not 
been freely convertible into other currencies and has also not been freely transferable 
from one non-resident to another. 
 
In line with (i), there was no restriction on using blocked rand in one account for the 
purchase of local securities and the subsequent sale of those securities to another 
resident for another currency, say dollars, and then the subsequent sale in South 
Africa by the new holder, thus resulting in the blocked  rand be held for a different 
account.   
 
This is explained via example 2. Specifically, let tb  be the blocked rand exchange rate 
(expressed as rand per dollar) in period t (t = 1, 2), and Jp ( Lp ) be the share price of 
De Beers in Johannesburg (London) in rand (dollar).  
 
A non-resident holder of blocked rand uses them to purchase De Beers shares in 
Johannesburg. In terms of the earlier example this brings us to the following balance 
sheet 
 
Non-resident # 1 initial position in period 1 
De Beers (25 X R 40)             R 1000  
 
 
He then sells those shares in London to a UK stockbroker. Suppose that the price of 
De Beers in London is $10 than we have the following blance sheet mutations. 
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Transaction 1a: Non-resident # 1 disinvests from SA shares and sells in London in period 2 
De Beers             -R 1000 
 
 
US$                  + 250  
 
Transaction 1b: Non-resident # 2 (UK stockbroker) invests in SA shares and buys in London in period 
2  
De Beers            +R 1000 
 
 
US$                  - 250  
 
Note that the implicit ‘blocked’ rand exchange rate in period 2, 2b , is =
L
J
p
p
R40/$10 
= R4 per dollar.   
 
If non-resident # 2 in turn would sell his shares on the JSE (see transaction 1c below) 
the proceeds would become blocked rand again.  
 
Transaction 1c: Non-resident # 2 disinvests from JSE in period 2 
De Beers             -R 1000 
 
 
Blocked Rand                        + R 1000    
 
In the latter case the net effect of transactions 1a-1c is that blocked rand balances have 
been transferred from non-resident # 1 to non-resident # 2 (in exchange for dollars at 
the implicit blocked rand exchange rate of R4 per dollar, i.e. 42 =b ) via the London 
and Johannesburg stock exchanges.  
 
As can be seen from this example, while the composition of the stock of assets held 
by non-residents could be altered and individual non-residents could disinvest from 
the country (here non-resident #1), the key characteristic of the blocked (later 
‘financial’) rand system was that non-residents as a group (the ‘total stock’ would 
remain the same) could not (FT, p. 14). 
 
More generally, Gidlow (1976, p. 85) points out that the fact that blocked rand 
balances could be used to purchase shares quoted on the JSE, which could be 
endorsed, exported and sold outside the country enabled London stockbrokers –
unofficial market dealers - to make a market for blocked rands (to quote the rand at a  
price against the U.S. dollar) where the relevant monies were freely transferred 
between non-residents using a method known as ‘gilt-wash’. As pointed out by FT, 
this parallel market could be characterised as legal, although not officially recognised. 
Via the so-called ‘gilt-wash’ method, a de facto second currency emerged.6 We  
illustrate the functioning of the method with example 3 below (adapted from FT).  
 
A non-resident holder of blocked rand uses them to purchase gilt securities from a SA 
financial institution through a local stockbroker. The stockbroker sourced the 
                                                 
6 Gidlow (1976, p. 87) points out that the blocked rand market was a (more) limited market (than the 
oficial market). Note that the size (liquidity) of this market was of course constrained by the number of 
(local) SA equities that had London stock quotations.  
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securities from the South African financial institution who lent the securities (SA 
government bonds) to the local (SA) stockbroker in return for a commission (this is 
the phenomenon known as ‘securities lending’). The stockbroker then sells the scrip7 
to his or her London counterpart (non-resident # 2) for dollars8 (the London 
stockbroker makes the market by quoting a price for blocked rand in dollars). The 
London broker duly sells the scrip back to the local broker, who in turn sells it back to 
the financial institution.  
 
The dollars go to non-resident # 1, and the London broker (non-resident # 2) has an 
account in South Africa credited with blocked rand. Thus we have the following 
balance sheet mutations. 
 
Non-resident # 1 portfolio in period 1  
Gilt securities                        + R 1000 
Blocked Rand                                           – R 1000 
 
 
Transaction 1a: Non-resident # 1 disinvests from SA gilts and sells in London in period 2 
Gilt securities             -R 1000 
 
US$                                             +1000* 





2
1
b
 
 
Transaction 1b: Non-resident # 2 (UK stockbroker) invests in SA gilts and buys in London in period 2 
Gilt securities            +R 1000 
 
 
US$                                             -1000* 





2
1
b
 
 
 
Transaction 1c: Non-resident # 2 sells SA gilts in SA in period 2 
Gilt securities             -R 1000 
 
 
Blocked Rand                        + R 1000    
 
As explained by FT (2004, p. 6) despite the number of transactions listed here, in 
practice no physical movement of scrip took place (SA financial institutions 
essentially ‘lent’ gilts9 in return for a commission). As before, the net effect of 
transactions 1a-1c is that blocked rand balances have been transferred from non-
resident # 1 to non-resident # 2 – the London stockbroker - (in exchange for dollars at 
the parallel exchange rate) via London and Johannesburg brokers.10  
 
                                                 
7 Shorthand for subscription; i.e. provisional certificate (subscribed to company/issuer) entitling holder 
to formal certificate and dividends/interest. As pointed out by FT, gilts were used in preference to 
ordinary shares because of their lower brokerage rates and greater availability.  
8 FT formulate their example in terms of sterling. 
9 This method of transfering funds arose because under local exchange control regulations blocked rand 
balances could not be transferred to another non-resident without the transfer of scrip and relevant 
brokers’ notes. 
10 Gidlow (1976, p. 89) points out that the method of transferring blocked rands using the ‘gilt wash’ 
method was normally used when a broker was buying blocked rands from an individual; if brokers 
wished to transfer balances between themselves then it was probably easier and less complicated to do 
this by dealing through the share market.  
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FT (2004, p. 6) note that blocked rand were not freely transferable from one non-
resident to another. It has been argued that the authorities were not willing to allow 
this since it would have granted official recognition to the floating blocked rand 
exchange rate, an action which it seemed undesirable in an era of fixed exchange 
rates. More specific, Gidlow (1976, p. 87) states that the recognition of a second 
exchange rate, which would normally have been lower than the oficial rate, would not 
benefit South Africa’s image abroad at a time when the attachment to fixed exchange 
rates was strong, and might cast suspicion on the maintenance of the oficial exchange 
rate for the rand. 
 
Note that under the blocked rand system a non-resident investor has two options if he 
or she wanted to invest in SA securities. Route 1 is to buy dollars on the official FX 
market and exchange the latter for SA securities. This route is illustrated by the first 
row of Table 2.1 below (the second row indicates the corresponding disinvestment).11 
Alternatively, the investor could first buy SA securities listed in London with dollars, 
sell the securities in Johannesburg and get blocked rand in return (row 3).  
 
Table 2.1 The Basic Mechanics of the Blocked Rand System (Options Available 
to Non-Residents) 
a. Buy rand: Non-resident 
sells 1 
dollar→ 
  →Non-resident 
receives 1e rand 
1. Cash FX 
market 
(Johannesburg) 
channel via 
official FX 
dealers:  
b. Sell rand 
(unless 
generated by 
sales of  SA 
securities, then 
go to 2b): 
Non-resident 
sells 1 
rand→ 
  →Non-resident 
receives US$ 





1
1
e
 
a. Buy 
blocked rand: 
Non-resident 
sells 1 
dollar→ 
Buy SA 
securities 
listed in 
London (L) at 
$ Lp → 
Sell SA 
securities in 
Johannesburg 
(J) at R Jp → 
→Non-resident 
receives 
L
J
p
p
b =1  
blocked rand 
2. Stock 
exchanges 
(London) 
channel via 
brokers: 
b. Sell blocked 
rand: 
Non-resident 
sells 1 
blocked  
rand→ 
Buy SA 
securities 
listed in 
Johannesburg 
(J) at R Jp → 
Sell SA 
securities in 
London (L) at 
$ Lp → 
→Non-resident 
receives 
US$
J
L
p
p
b
=





1
1
 
 
Obviously, the investor would choose the direct (indirect) route if the commercial rate 
was weaker (stronger) than the blocked rate, i.e. if 11 )( be <> .
12  
 
                                                 
11 Obviously, by disinvesting from South Africa financial rand were ‘created’. Conversely, when 
financial rand balances were used to parchase these assets, financial rand were ‘destroyed’ (in the sense 
that they became ordinary comercial rands in the hands of the South African seller). This situation was 
complicated by the fact that financial rand were also created when the authorities redesignated 
comercial rand as financial rand in order to allow residents access to the market [Farell and Todani 
(2004, p. 19)]. 
12 In addition, Gidlow (1976, p. 91) points out that some non-residents might have been unwilling to 
deal directly with Johannesburg for political reasons. This would have boosted demand for blocked 
rand, and ceteris paribus decreased the blocked rand discount. 
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Gidlow (1976, p. 85) states that the typical pricing on the parrallel market was such 
that the blocked rand generally traded at a discount to (was weaker than) the 
comercial (oficial) exchange rate, or,  
 
e
p
p
b
L
J >=           (2) 
 
The reasons for this persistent blocked rand discount phenomenon can be clearly 
inferred from equation (2). According to Gidlow (1976, p. 86), they were   
 
(i) a relative lack of London demand for SA shares – weak direct foreign interest in 
local shares - (low Lp ) matched by  
(ii) a tendency for local buying (associated with capital controls on residents that 
inhibited off-shore investments by residents), which has tended to push prices on the 
Johannesburg exchange to a premium (high Jp ).  
 
Gidlow (1976) notes that there has been no direct counteraction to this tendency since 
London has been pre-empted from taking advantage of the premium on Johannesburg 
prices as any proceeds so realized are blocked.13   
 
Also the continuance of the blocked rand discount has been aided by the fact that non-
resident companies wishing to repatriate funds abroad following, for instance the sales 
of assets here but refused exchange control permission to use the official foreign 
exchange market facilities, have been forced to channel these funds through the 
blocked rand market by buying securities locally and selling overseas, thus widening 
the discount.14 So, in general following FT (2004, p. 6) we can say that the discount 
reflected the relative demands for South African shares by residents and non-
residents, and the existence of exchange controls on both sets of transactors.  
 
2.2 THE BLOCKED RAND SYSTEM: EVALUATION  
 
Let us now evaluate South Africa’s first experience with capital controls. The 
objectives of the blocked rand system were to prevent sudden capital outflows via the 
official foreign exchange market. The reason was that any potential large-scale capital 
outflows stemming from, say, transient political factors could cause the gold and 
foreign exchange reserves to fall substantially. 15  
 
The way the controls on outflows were supposed to work can be seen fairly easily by 
inspecting the relevant accounts of the balance of payments. Those are reported in 
Table 2.2 below.  
 
                                                 
13 Conversely, it has been very unusual for the blocked rand to go to a premium since then it would 
become cheaper for the US investor to remit funds directly to South Africa at the ruling official 
exchange rate to buy shares.  
14 Thus, it appears that to some extent the discount could be affected by the SA authorities as stricter 
(looser) application of exchange control regulations on non-residents would increase (decrease) the 
supply of blocked rand and hence widen (narrow) the discount with respect to the official rate.  
15 Which in turn under a completely stable exchange rate for the rand  – such as the gold standard - 
automatically translated into tighter domestic liquidity conditions. 
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Table 2.2 Home (Reporting) Country’s Major Balance of Payments Accounts* 
1 Exports of goods and services (+) 1  
Merchandise 
Services 
  Travel, insurance, banking etc. 
  Home income from assets held abroad: interest, 
dividends etc. 
 
2 Imports of goods and services (-) 
Merchandise 
Services 
  Travel, insurance, banking etc. 
  Foreign investors’ income from assets in the 
home country: interest, dividends etc. 
 
3 Unilateral transfers ((-) = net outflow)  
-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
 4 Current account (= 1 + 2 + 3) 
5 Private home assets abroad, net (increase = 
capital outflow (-)) 
  Direct investment 
  Portfolio investment 
 
6 Private foreign assets in home (reporting) 
country, net (increase = capital inflow (+)) 
  Direct investment 
  Portfolio investment 
-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
 7 Capital account (5 + 6) 
-----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 8 Change in foreign exchange reserves held by 
home central bank 2  (4 + 7, increase = (-)) 
* We abstract from statistical discrepancies and special drawing rights (SDRs). 
1  Credit items – those that earn forein exchange – enter with a plus sign while all debit items enter with 
a negative sign.  
2 Also known as the official settlements balance, or the balance of official financing. 
 
It is clear from Table 2.2 above that the blocked rand system mainly related to capital 
account item 6.16 Importantly, decreases in 6 were discouraged due to controls on 
non-residents. In this sense, the capital account of the BOP (item 7) was (partly) 
insulated from capital flows.17  
 
As a consequence of the above, the blocked rand system also insulated the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves from capital outflows. The reason is that a country’s 
change in foreign reserves is by definition given by the sum of current and capital 
account mutations – with the latter being directly affected by exchange controls: 
 
                                                 
16 Increases in 5 were discouraged due to controls on residents. 
17 Farell (2001) claims that theoretical analysis of controls suggest that they should reduce the volatility 
of exchange rates. He quotes Dornbusch and Kuenzler (1993, p. 10), who say that ‘In a dual exchange 
rate system the comercial rate remains stable, whereas the free rate reflects the instability of portfolio 
holders’ expextations, and hence of capital flows’ 
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Capital account (5 + 6)          (7) 
 
Current account          (4) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Change in foreign exchange reserves held by home central bank 2  (4 + 7, increase = (-))  (8) 
 
In addition, because of the blocked rand system capital outflows – notional demand 
for dollars - did not translate into into effective demand for dollars, thus insulating the 
official (commercial) exchange rate from selling pressures that would have been 
initiated by non-residents selling SA securities. This in turn implied an overvalued 
official rate vis-à-vis the hypothetical level of the exchange rate in the absence of 
capital controls.  
 
However, as we have shown in this Section, an unintended consequence of the 
blocked rand system – which at the time was considered to be an emergency short-
term measure - was the emergence of a legal (although not officially recognized) 
parallel foreign exchange market. This can be nicely illustrated with a quote from De 
Kock, later to be governor of the South African Reserve Bank (FT, p. 4): 
 
‘We never thought at the time that we were instituting a dual exchange rate system. We thought we 
were simply applying exchange control, blocking funds of non-residents ... We did talk about it at the 
time. I mean even in those days there were people in South Africa who had heard of dual exchange rate 
systems, and there were some suggestions that we should, in fact, institute a formal dual exchange rate 
system. But we decided against this, partly because the extended exchange control was considered to 
be a temporary crisis measure (emphasis in the original).’ 
 
Note that the authorities cannot have been very thrilled with the emergence of the 
parallel market, as at that time South Africa operated under the aegis of Bretton 
Woods that is under a system of fixed exchange rates.18 Now, the parallel market 
implied the existence of a floating parallel exchange rate (for portfolio investments); 
an alien and probably unwelcome species at the time.  
 
Further, the forces of demand and supply (of blocked rand) in the parallel market 
dictated that since its inception in 1961 the blocked rand traded at a discount to the 
official commercial exchange rate.19  
 
This meant that new (net) overseas investors (such as those from the US) in 
repatriating funds from South Africa through the share market had therefore 
consistently been obliged to accept a capital loss equivalent to the differential between 
the official rand/dollar exchange rate and the blocked rand rate. [Gidlow (1976, p. 
86)].  
 
This can be made more explicit by considering the following example. Suppose a US 
investor has the choice of investing 1 dollar in the US with a return *i , or in South 
Africa with a return i . We assume that the investor invests for one period (where the 
initial new inflow goes through the commercial market, that is he or she uses the 
                                                 
18 After the demise of Bretton Woods, South Africa operated an exchange rate policy for the rand 
caracterized by fairly frequent changes in the rand’s parity against the dollar.  
19 Except for very brief periods when a slight premium emerged.  
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direct/Johannesburg channel), after which principal and interest are repatriated at the 
blocked rand exchange rates. Then the US investor would prefer to invest in SA if: 
 
( ) *
2
1 11 ii
b
e
+>+          (3) 
 
Equation (3) is the relevant  arbitrage relationship facing a non-resident investor. 
Now, for the moment we abstract from interest ( 0* == ii ) and assume that 42 =b  
and 31 =e  (as in our earlier examples). Then, it is clear that the capital loss on 
repatriation is $ 25.0$1
2
1 =





−
b
e . So, indeed the capital loss is proportional to the 
discount of the blocked rate versus the official rate. 
 
However, it stands to reason that instead of accepting a capital loss the US investor 
would like to be compensated for the expected capital loss implied by the discount. 
Put differently, in equilibrium the arbitrage relationship above should be seen as an 
equality, and can be rearranged as  
 
( )*
1
2 11 i
e
bi +=+          (4) 
 
Equation (4) above looks very similar to the usual uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition. This can be seen by taking logs on both sides, which yields  
 
12
* ebii −+=            (5) 
 
(where all symbols are now natural logs), and says that for a non-resident investor to 
be indifferent between investing in SA or US assets, the expected one-period return 
on SA assets should be equal to the overseas dollar return plus the expected 
depreciation of the blocked rate versus the commercial rate.   
 
Using modern terminology (see Figure 2.1 below) we can say that the required return 
on SA assets –SA’s cost of debt - consisted of two basic components: (i) the foreign 
(‘risk-free’) interest rate *i , plus (ii) a risk premium, which here consists of a 
‘currency premium’  12 eb − .
20  
 
                                                 
20 For an analysis on the relation between the currency (or risk) premium in South Africa and its 
exchange rate regime, see Schaling (2004).  
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Figure 2.1 Cost of Debt for an Emerging Market Borrower* 
 
 
* Source: Grandes, Peter and Pinaud (2003) 
 
Note that in turn the currency premium is the sum of (i) the (expected) rate of 
depreciation of the blocked rand and (ii) the blocked rate discount (hereafter called ρ ) 
versus the comercial rate. This can be seen by writing the currency premium as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 112111212 ρ+−=−+−=− bbebbbeb   
 
Thus, the currency premium goes up if today’s discount 1ρ  increases and/or if non-
residents expect the blocked rand to weaken in the future. Note that the latter appears 
to be an important ‘expectations channel’, whereby expectations of a weaker 
(stronger) blocked rate in the future (in period 2) imply a lower (higher) required rate 
of return by non-residents on SA assets.  
 
So, capital controls on outflows (initially in the form of ‘blocked rand’ accounts) in 
South Africa led to the emergence of a parallel foreign exchange market, which via 
the currency premium drove up sovereign debt costs in South Africa. Therefore, 
another unintended effect of the blocked rand system was to increase the cost of 
capital for the South African economy. 
 
However, there were futher adverse effects of the controls. Because of the existence 
of a persistent discount, if a non-resident wanted to invest in SA assets it would be 
cheaper to transfer dollar funds into rand (i) indirectly, namely to find another non-
resident that wanted to disinvest from the country – who had a supply of blocked rand 
that he wanted to sell – rather than (ii) directly, i.e. to buy rand on the official foreign 
exchange (cash) market.21  
 
However, because of the existence of the discount in case of (i), investment into South 
Africa, say by non-resident # 2, can only proceed if non-resident # 2 – who is ‘in the 
market’ to buy blocked rand – can be matched with a seller, say resident # 1, of 
blocked rand. This means that the investment in South Africa by non-resident # 2 is 
matched with a disinvestment by non-resident # 1 of a similar amount. Thus, a very 
                                                 
21 In terms of the two-period examples above, case (ii) corresponds with arbitrage inequality (3). 
However, because of the existence of the discount, (3) is now not the relevant condition. As the intial 
inflow now goes through the London market (after which interest and principal are still repatriated at 
the blocked rate), the relevant inequality that governs whether a non-resident investor would prefer to 
invest in South Africa now becomes: ( ) *
2
1 11 ii
b
b
+>+      (6) 
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important effect of the blocked rand system was that there could be no net investment 
into South Africa via the blocked rand! 
 
This phenomenon continued to raise its ugly head well into the 1990s - then under the 
flag of the financial rand system - FT (2004, p. 13) illustrate this disadvantage of the 
system by quoting Governor Stals [SARB (1980)]: 
 
‘[I]nvestments in South Africa by non-residents with financial rand do not benefit the balance of 
payments. The mechanism only enables non-residents as a group to shift existing investments in South 
Africa from one application to another’  
 
The realities of the blocked rand system were thus that there could be no net 
investment into South Africa via the blocked rand (the closed pool argument).  
Net investment – that would boost the country’s foreign exchange earnings - could 
only come into South Africa through the commercial market. However, that would 
only be attractive for non-residents in the counterfactual case of the blocked rand 
trading at a premium vis-à-vis the official exchange rate (in terms of the two-period 
examples if 11 be > ), or in terms of our familiar arbitrage conditions if 
 
( ) ( ) *
2
1
2
1 111 ii
b
bi
b
e
+>+>+                   (7)22 
 
So, it appears that another unintended effect of the controls on outflows was that they 
turned into serious implicit quantity restrictions on net capital inflows (especially U.S. 
and European portfolio investment) which did not exactly benefit foreign reserves and 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.23  For, although the controls on outflows protected 
the foreign reserves from declining, they also limited net-capital inflows - which 
would have boosted those reserves.24 
 
Huizinga (1996) makes the general point that multiple exchange rate practices, or 
generally any official selling or buying of foreign exchange at a rate different from the 
‘equilibrium’ rate, have long been recognized to be quasi-fiscal activities as they 
immediately impact on the public finances. In fact, multiple exchange rate systems 
can be interpreted as a set of separate taxes on international capital flows and goods 
trade. A typical two-tiered exchange rate system with a commercial exchange rate (for 
all current account transactions) and a financial exchange rate (for all capital account 
transactions) enables the authorities to tax domestic money and other financial assets 
                                                 
22 Gidlow (1976, p. 92) notes that if the blocked rand would be trading at a premium – i.e. if inequality 
(6) held – that would offer temptations for the Reserve Bank to sell rands to non-residents for foreign 
exchange, which apart from boosting the official foreign reserves would provide a potential profit if 
subsequently the receipts were sold in the official exchange market.  
23 Gidlow (1976, p. 88) points out that traditionally the JSE has tended to need a a strong foreign 
interest for local dealing to be lively. He points to a fairly close correlation between changes in foreign 
portfolio investment and movements in industrial share prices, while the volatility of the ‘gold shares’ 
market was also largely the product of changes in overseas sentiment towards gold shares.  
24 An additional effect of the controls was that sometimes non-residents that considered to invest in, 
say, SA equities via the blocked rand market, found the mechanism to be cumbersome and were 
therefore discouraged from proceeding. [Gidlow (1976, p. 90)].  
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at different implicit rates. Consider now the tax treatment of interest (and other 
financial returns such as dividends) implicit in the blocked rand system.  
 
We already know that inflows would tend to use the commercial (financial) channel, 
if 11 )( eb >< , that is if the blocked rand traded at a premium (discount) vis-as-vis the 
blocked rand. Regarding outflows, we know that non-residents could (i) use the stock 
market (the blocked rand market). Alternatively, (ii) non-residents could invest the 
blocked rand in government, municipial and public utility stocks with a maturity of 
five years or more. Once these had been held for at least five years, they could be 
repatriated at the official rate. Finally, (iii) non-residents could use the blocked rand to 
take up special non-resident bonds with five year maturities issued by the 
government. These could again be repatriated at the official exchange rate on 
maturity. In cases (ii) and (iii) repatriation of capital and interest would be at the 
commercial rate, whilst in case (i) it would be at the blocked rate. In terms of the two-
period examples above, we can therefore distinguish several cases depending on 
whether the country experienced a discount or premium, and how money left the 
country. In total, there are 2 x 3 = 6 cases. These – together with the relevant arbitrage 
conditions – can be found in Table 2.3 below. 
 
Table 2.3 Quasi-Fiscal Aspects of the Blocked Rand System 
 Inflows Outflows Relevant arbitrage 
condition 
1. Via blocked rand 
market: 2b  ( )
*
2
1 11 ii
b
b
+>+ (6) 
2. Via government, 
municipial and public 
utility stocks: 2e  
*
2
1
2
1 1 ii
e
b
e
b
+>+ (8) 
Blocked rand trades at 
discount: 11 eb >  
Via blocked rand 
market 
3. Via special non-
resident bonds: 2e  
*
2
1
2
1 1 ii
e
b
e
b
+>+ (8) 
4. Via blocked rand 
market: 2b  ( )
*
2
1 11 ii
b
e
+>+ (3) 
5. Via government, 
municipial and public 
utility stocks: 2e  
*
2
1
2
1 1 ii
e
e
e
e
+>+  
Blocked rand trades at 
premium: 11 eb <  
Via commercial rand 
market 
6. Via special non-
resident bonds: 2e  
*
2
1
2
1 1 ii
e
e
e
e
+>+  
 
Note that cases 1 and 6 correspond with arbitrage equations (6) and (1) (that have 
already been discussed earlier).  
 
Under cases 2 and 3 non-residents holding SA assets receive 2/1 e rather than 
2/1 b units of foreign currency for each unit of interest (and capital) repatriated abroad. 
This suggests that non-residents receive an additive subsidy σ  for each unit of 
interest and capital equal to 1−ρ , where as before eb /=ρ  is the financial rate 
discount versus the commercial rate. Thus, another characteristic of the blocked rand 
system was that it subsidized capital inflows, i.e. it subsidized international lending. 
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Since a subsidy can be interpreted as a negative tax, this shows that the system also 
had important fiscal implications.  
 
Perhaps as a compensation for the difficulty associated with the repatriation of the 
proceeds of SA asset sales, non-residents were encouraged – offered subsidies – to 
hold South African debt. As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 5) this aspect of the blocked 
rand system had attracted domestic criticism for a number of years as a result of the 
extremely high yields to redemption on offer for non-residents. As a consequence, 
option 2 above was modified in the 1978 budget. Under the new arrangements, in 
place from 30 March 1978, the proceeds of such stocks could only be repatriated on 
redemption through the securities (financial) rand or invested in new 6 percent bonds 
introduced by the Treasury.  
 
Next, consider the implications of the capital controls as exemplified by the blocked 
rand system for monetary and exchange rate policies. Note that according to equation  
 
( ) ( ) 112*1112*12* ρ−−+=−+−+=−+= eeibeeeibeii     (8) 
 
(in logs) corresponding with cases 2 and 3 of Table 2.3 above, the monetary 
authorities are free to choose an exchange rate policy consistent with the desired 
domestic interest rate, i  [Huizinga (1996)].  
 
Calling the latter di for a given (expected) rate of depreciation of the commercial 
exchange rate 12 ee − , they can for instance affect the blocked rand discount via 
interventions in the spot commercial market to bring about the desired value i . This 
can be seen by first decomposing the commercial rate as 
 
eee FLOAT += 11           (9) 
 
So, the commercial rate (in logs) is the sum of the floating rate ( FLOATe1 ) in the 
absence of intervention, and the support from buying ( 0<= −ee ) or selling 
( 0>= +ee ) of commercial rand by the SARB.25 Thus, in case of SARB buying 
(selling) the commercial rate would be firmer (weaker) than in the absence of 
intervention, i.e. FLOATee 11 < (
FLOATee 11 > ).
26  
 
Substituting (9) in (8) we get 
 
( ) ( )eebeeii FLOAT −−−−+= 1112*        (8’) 
 
                                                 
25 It should be remembered that here FLOATe is not a truly floating commercial exchange rate, but one 
that is already heavily insulated from capital flows via controls on residents and non-residents. 
26 If the SARB were to target the commercial rate at de say, then its optimal intervention policy 
according to (9) would be FLOATd eee 1−=  (9’). This equation indicates that given its exchange rate 
target, the SARB would ‘lean against the wind’ by selling (bying) commercial rand if the underlying 
‘fundamental’ commercial rate FLOATe1  (coming say from the current account of the balance of 
payments) appreciates (depreciates). 
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Equation (8’) can be reformulated as a reaction function governing CB spot 
intervention to bring about (target) a desired value for i . So, we rewrite (8’) so that 
i becomes the policy target di , and e  is the CB’s instrument. This yields: 
 
( ) ( ) FLOATd ebeeiie 1112* −+−−−=                  (10) 
 
Equation (10) is the central bank’s optimal reaction function governing its exchange 
rate policy. It indicates that in the presence of capital controls South Africa can 
decouple its interest rate from the international interest rate, i.e. 0* <− ii d , but that 
this comes at the price of a (most probably) overvalued commercial exchange rate 
effectuated inter alia by spot market intervention ( 0<e ). Also evident from this 
equation is the role played by ‘fundamentals’ as proxied by FLOATe1 . This term simply 
indicates that if the commercial rate is appreciating (depreciating) because of a current 
account surplus (deficit) the SARB can ‘lean against the wind’ by buying (selling) 
dollars in the commercial market. As is clear from the above, FLOATe1  would be most 
likely positively correlated with the current account position, and thus with variables 
like the gold price.27  
 
The discussion above has one further implication, and that is that if monetary policy is 
set according to (10), then the exchange rate is the‘instrument’ of policy rather than 
an outcome variable. This suggests an early rationale for anchoring monetary policy 
via the exchange rate, rather than via the domestic interest rate.28  
 
We conclude this Section by summarizing the intended and unintended consequences 
of the blocked rand system, taken from the earlier analysis. This summary can be 
found in Table 2.4.  
 
                                                 
27 From the above discussion it follows that if the CB trades off direct comercial rate stabilization and 
engineering a lower domestic rate via an overvalued comercial rate, its optimal intervention policy 
would be a weighted average of (9’) and (10). Calling the weight on (preference for) direct exchange 
rate targeting 10 ≤≤ α , then we have 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) dFLOATd eebeeiie αααα +−−+−−−−−= 1112* 111 , which collapses to (9’) ((10)) 
if α =1 (0). 
28 At the risk of oversimplification, a policy menu that appears to have been quite attractive to 
monetary policy makers in South Africa during most of the post Bretton Woods period (perhaps even 
until the advent of inflation targeting and the closure of the NOFP).  
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Table 2.4 Effects of the Blocked Rand System 
Intended Consequences Unintended Consequences 
1. Insulation of the (capital account of the) 
BOP from capital flows. That is, the BOP was 
protected from outflows driven by non-resident 
selling of SA securities. 
1. The blocked accounts adversely affected 
South Africa’s image abroad as an investment 
destination. 
2. Insulation of the commercial market 
(official) exchange rate of the rand from 
capital flows. That is, the commercial rate was 
prevented to depreciate in line with the 
outflows under 1 above. 
2. Emergence of an (offshore) parallel foreign 
exchange market. 
3. Providing more effective protection for the 
foreign reserves (insulation of the country’s 
level of foreign exchange reserves from capital 
flows). That is FX reserves were also protected 
from declining in line with 1 above. 
3. Emergence of a discount between the 
blocked and comercial rand exchange rates.  
 
 4. The discount further damaged South 
Africa’s image abroad - at a time when the 
attachment to fixed exchange rates was strong 
-  because it  might cast suspicion on the 
maintenance (affected the ‘credibility’) of the 
oficial exchange rate for the rand. 
 5. Because of the discount, a ‘currency 
premium’ emerged which raised the cost of 
debt for the South African economy. 
 6. Controls on outflows implied serious 
implicit quantity restrictions on capital inflows 
that would have boosted the country’s foreign 
exchange reserves. 
 7. Potential inventors (non-residents that 
considered to invest in, say, SA equities via the 
blocked rand market) found the mechanism to 
be cumbersome and could therefore be 
discouraged from proceeding 
 8. The system ended up subsidizing capital 
inflows (international lending)  
4. When introduced in 1961, the controls were 
meant as  a temporary crisis measure) 
9. Unintended very substantial ‘institutional 
inertia’: eventual evolution first into an 
informal  (blocked and securities rand) and 
then into  a formal (financial rand) dual 
exchange rate system (in 1979). 
 10. The presence of exchange controls on 
residents enabled the SARB to target domestic 
interest rates via FX market interventions in 
the comercial market. This provides an early 
rationale for anchoring monetary policy via the 
exchange rate, rather than via domestic interest 
rates. 
 
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976, p. 87), on occasions recommendations have been put 
forward that the blocking procedure be abolished, but the authorities have taken the 
view that such a move could have unpredictable repercussions and lead to volatile 
capital flows (which in turn could play havoc with foreign exchange reserves and 
domestic liquidity conditions). Instead, on 26 August 1975, the SARB announced 
changes in the blocked rand system that were mostly motivated by unintended 
consequences # 1, 2 6 and 7; the so-called ‘securities rand system’, its main idea was 
to ‘boost overseas interest in the Republic as an investment outlet’ and to move the 
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offshore parallel market to Johannesburg. The securities rand system – that allowed 
blocked rand balances to be officially and directly transferred among non-residents - 
is discussed below.  
 
3.1 THE SECURITIES RAND SYSTEM 
 
As indicated by FT (2004, p. 7), the possibility of abolishing the blocked rand system 
was mentioned many times. However, changes only came in 1975. More specific, on 
26 August 1975 the SARB announced several changes regarding South African 
exchange control regulations designed to boost overseas interest in the Republic as an 
investment outlet.29   
 
Note that the ‘dismantling of the blocked rand system’ did not mean that the rand in 
question was no longer blocked. Indeed, the administrative controls on capital 
outflows by non-residents as a pool remained very much the same. However, some 
details of the mechanism were changed.  
 
On 30 January 1976 the Reserve Bank issued a circular that gave further details of the 
new regulations which were to become effective on 2 February of the same year.  
 
The Bank stated that as from the latter date the expression ‘securities rand’ should be 
used instead of blocked rand to denote the local sale and redemption proceeds of 
South African securities and other investments in South Africa owned by non-
residents. All non-resident accounts falling under this category must be designated 
securities rand accounts. Also, the blocked accounts of immigrants to South Africa 
who have not completed three years’ residence must also be designated as securities 
rand accounts. However, the Bank said emigrant’s funds which are blocked in South 
Africa must continue to be referred to as blocked rand, and other accounts of 
emigrants designated as blocked rand accounts. Hence as from February 1976 the 
term ‘blocked rand’ had a more restricted meaning than had been the case since its 
introduction in 1961.  
 
Under the new regulations securities rand will be bought and sold through brokers on 
the Johannesburg stock exchange. The idea was that by removing the necessity of 
dealing through the arbitrage operations mentioned earlier (through the London 
channel) blocked rand could be transferred more easily and more cheaply, and 
become more accessible to overseas investors.30 
 
The Bank further stated that only those branches of authorized foreign exchange 
dealers who have been appointed as authorized banks may maintain securities rand 
balances. Thus transfers of securities rand will take place from one securities rand 
account to another in the books of one bank, and from a securities rand account with 
one bank to a securities rand account with another bank. [Gidlow (1976, p. 84)] 
 
Thus, the securities rand allowed for direct transfers between non-residents, and for 
the trading of the securities rand through brokers on the JSE. This is a major change 
                                                 
29 SARB (1975). 
30 Gidlow (1976, p. 91) points out that psychologically such a move looked beneficial. For those 
investors not fully acquainted with existing blocked rand procedures, the announcement making 
blocked rand balances officially transferable may have created a favourable impression.  
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with respect to the blocked rand system as there blocked rand was not freely 
transferrable from one non-resident to another. As said before allowing the latter 
would have granted official recognition to the blocked rand exchange rate, an action 
which the authorities deemed undesirable in an era of fixed exchange rates.  
 
However, in 1976 the era of irrevocably fixed exchange rates was over, and South 
Africa’s exchange rate regime could be best described as a ‘variable rand-dollar peg’ 
(combined with the securities rand, that is combined with an extensive menu of 
capital controls on residents and non-residents). As pointed out by Gidlow (1976, p. 
88), in this environment the recognition of a second floating exchange rate for 
portfolio investment did not pose the same difficulties as before when South Africa 
desired to maintain a stable exchange rate for the rand.  
 
Another reason for the changes in the blocked rand system was the belief that 
securities rand transactions would be diverted from London to Johannesburg. FT 
indicate that this did not materialize, primarily because of the dominance of London 
as a financial centre.31 The familiarity of non-resident investors with London, the 
technical superiority of the market, and the operation of London dealers as principals 
in the securities rand market were all contributory factors here.  
 
Gidlow (1976, p. 93) points out that after the Reserve Bank had decided to recognize 
the blocked rand discount officially, and to allow non-resident balances to be freely 
transferable, it could now intervene in the securities rand market irrespective of what 
the rate was, in the interests of stability. So, by officially recognizing the second 
floating exchange rate for portfolio investment transactions (and by allowing direct 
transfers) the SARB had now the ability to enter the market (either as a buyer or a 
seller) for securities rand as well. It stands to reason to assume that the Bank was 
unhappy about the discount and would have liked to stabilize the securities rate at, 
say, a small discount to the official rate.32  
 
Drawing upon our earlier discussion on spot market intervention, and letting s  be the 
securities rand exchange rate, we can simply use equation (8) (where we have 
substituted 1s  for 1b ) 
 
12
* seii −+=                     (11) 
 
Now if we assume SARB intervention in the securities rand market, then (as before) 
we can decpompose the securities rand exhange rate as 
 
sss FLOAT += 11                    (12) 
                                                 
31 Gidlow (1976, p. 91) –at the time of the announcement of the changes - points out that it would be 
wrong to assume that London stands to be seriously affected, since dealings by foreigners through that 
market will continue as well as arbitrage operations between that centre and Johannesburg; the London 
market will probably still remain a major centre for South African shares. Thus, according to Gidlow 
foreigners will continue to acquire blocked rands through London arbitrageurs rather than buying 
directly in Johannesburg.  
32 Remember that the discount captured the perceptions of foreign investors and therefore their 
willingness to leave assets in the country [Farell and Todani (2004, p. 24)]. Ceteris paribus, the higher 
(lower) the discount the less (more) willing foreign investors are willing to leave assets in South Africa. 
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So, the securities rate is the sum (all variables are logs) of the floating rate ( FLOATs1 ) in 
the absence of intervention, and the support from buying ( 0<= −ss ) or selling 
( 0>= +ss ) of securities rand by the SARB. Thus, in case of SARB buying (selling) 
the securities rate would be firmer (weaker) than in the absence of intervention, i.e. 
FLOATss 11 < (
FLOATss 11 > ).
33 
 
Combining (11) and (12) we get 
 
( )sseii FLOAT +−+= 12*                                     (13)34 
 
Obviously, the logic regarding intervention in ther securities rand market is then 
similar to the one outlined under spot commercial market intervention, meaning that 
in principle given *i , 2e (a given depreciation expectation of the commercial rate) and 
the ‘market level’ of the securities rate, s  can be chosen so as to bring about a desired 
level of the domestic interest rate. 
 
Gidlow (1976, p. 93) points out that aforementioned intervention operations could be 
subject to several constraints. Firstly, as soon as the securities rand market was 
subject to official intervention, profit (or loss) implications would arise. Secondly, the 
securities rand market would probably not be sufficiently broad (liquid) to smoothly 
absorb sizeable sales or purchases by the authorities without significantly altering the 
securities rand rate ( s ) as well as conditions on the stock market. 
 
3.2 THE SECURITIES RAND SYSTEM: EVALUATION 
 
The securities rand system was introduced to allow direct transfers of blocked rand 
between non-residents. The idea was that securities rand would be sold and bought 
through brokers on the JSE, thereby relocating trade from London to Johannesburg. 
Using modern terminology, the authorities wanted to ‘promote Johannesburg as a 
financial centre’. As we have pointed out, this did not materialize because of the 
familiarity of non-residents with London, the technical superiority of the market and 
the operation of London dealers as principals in the securities rand market. In 
addition, by officially recognizing the blocked rand exchange rate, the authorities 
could now intervene in the securities market and in this way do something about the 
discount versus the commercial rate that pushed up the cost of capital for the South 
African economy. However, said interventions were handicapped by the limited 
liquidity of the securities rand market. 
 
                                                 
33 If the SARB were to target the securities rate at ds say, then its optimal intervention policy 
according to (12) would be FLOATd sss 1−=  (12’). This equation indicates that given its exchange 
rate target, the SARB would ‘lean against the wind’ by selling (bying) securities rand if the underlying 
‘fundamental’ securities rate FLOATs1  appreciates (depreciates). 
34 Note that the corresponding equation for the blocked rand system is 12
* beii −+=  (8). Note that 
here the SARB has no leverage over the currency premium because it cannot intervene in the blocked 
rand market.  
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We conclude this Section by summarizing the intended and unintended consequences 
of the securities rand system. This summary can be found in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Effects of the Securities Rand System 
Intended Consequences Unintended Consequences 
Boost overseas interest in the Republic as an 
investment outlet. 
 
Allowing for direct transfers of securities rand 
balances between non-residents. 
 
Official recognition of the ‘securities rand’ 
exchange rate, that is of the existence of a 
parallel foreign exchange market. 
 
Allowing the authorities to intervene in the 
securities rand market. 
Securities rand market was not sufficiently 
liquid to smoothly absorb sizeable 
interventions. 
Relocating trade from offshore (London) 
parallel foreign exchange market to onshore 
(Johannesburg) market 
 
Encourage direct foreign interest in local 
shares 
Relocation of trade from London to 
Johannesburg did not materialize. Promotion 
of Johannesburg as a ‘financial centre’ was 
ineffective. 
Increase foreign exchange earnings for South 
Africa through new portfolio investments 
Fundamental imbalance between uses of 
(demand for) and sources (supply) of securities 
rand by non-residents led to a substantial 
discount, )( es − , between the securities and 
the oficial rate. In turn, the discount inhibited 
non-resident investment through the oficial 
market and the associated foreign exchange 
earnings. 
 With the securities rand at a discount to the 
commercial, SA borrowers could have to had 
repay at the securities rate existing loans 
originally contracted at the official rate. This 
increased the cost of capital for the South 
African economy. 
 
The securities rand system operated until 1979, when it was replaced by the financial 
rand on the recommendations of the interim report of the De Kock Commission 
(Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1978).  
 
4.1 THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM 
 
As pointed out by FT, from the late 1970s, the policy-making environment in South 
Africa assumed a more market-oriented profile. Gerhard de Kock, later Governor of 
the Reserve Bank between 1981 and 1989, was influential in this regard, particularly 
as a result of his chairing of the Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and 
Monetary Policy in South Africa (the de Kock commission). 
 
Asked by the Government to initially investigate exchange rate arrangements in South 
Africa, the de Kock Commission published its relevant interim report in January 
1979. The commission proposed an evolutionary process of reform of the exchange 
rate system, which entailed both short-term amd longer-term recommendations.   
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In the shorter-term, the commission considered a number of alternatives to SA’s 
existing ‘variable rand-dollar peg combined with the securities rand’ system, 
including a formal dual exchange rate system (DRS). On the assumption that the 
pressures on the capital account of the balance of payments would ease over time, the 
commission opted in the long-term for a unitary rand, subject to a ‘managed float’, 
with limited exchange controls being applied only to residents [FT (2004, p. 8)]. 
Figure 4.1 summarizes 
 
Figure 4.1 The ‘Road Map’ for Exchange Control Relaxation in 1978 
 
‘Variable rand-dollar peg 
combined with the 
securities rand’ system 
→ More developed and formal 
system with a manged, 
market determined rate for 
an independent and flexible 
‘commercial rand’ and a 
more freely floating rate for 
a ‘financial rand’ 
→ Unitary rand, subject to a 
‘managed float’, with 
limited exchange controls 
being applied only to 
residents 
 
Looking at Figure 4.1 above, it appears that the road map for the relaxation of 
exchange control in the late 1970s looked a bit like a (horizontal) ‘diamond’: short-
term expansion and long-term contraction. However, the contraction or scaling-down 
of controls did not happen for a long time. Only 17 years later, in 1995, were most of 
the controls on non-residents scrapped and the rand unified.  
 
In the short-term, the commission recommended that the securities rand system be 
gradually expanded into a  
 
‘more developed and formal system with a managed, market determined rate for an independent and 
flexible ‘commercial rand’ and a more freely floating rate for a ‘financial rand’[para 149, quoted by FT 
(2004, p. 8), emphasis mine]. 
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 8), the envisaged developments in the securities rand 
system included extending the uses which non-residents could make of the currency, 
as well as allowing certain resident transactions to take place via the (securities rand) 
market. As far as non-residents were concerned, the widening of the market was 
intended to remove the imbalance between the sources (supply of) and uses (demand) 
for securities rand refelected by the existence of the securities rand discount. Figure 
4.2 illustrates. 
 
Figure 4.2 Effects of Sources and Uses of Securities Rand 
Sources 
of 
securities 
rand ↑ 
(supplied 
by non-
residents)  
→ tends to 
weaken s  
→ Discount = ( )es −  
widens (narrows) due to 
increased supply 
(demand) 
← tends to 
strengthen 
s  
← Uses for 
securities 
rand↑ 
(demanded 
by residents 
and non-
residents)  
 
Obviously, the securities rand market was one characterized by ‘excess supply’ as 
reflected inter alia by not allowing non-residents to use the official market to channel 
funds out of the country (controls on non-residents). In addition, as mentioned earlier 
reasons for the existence of a persistent discount were lack of London demand for SA 
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shares (low Lp ), matched by a tendency for local buying of local shares (high Jp ) 
associated with controls on residents that inhibited off-shore investments.35  
The solution to the problem of the discount proposed by the commission was to 
recommend equity investment and disinvestment (in all real and financial assets) as 
financial rand transactions. Transfers from deceased estates to non-residents and 
immigrant funds were also recommended as financial rand transactions. In addition, 
residents’ use of the financial market, was to be expanded gradually and would 
require exchange control approval (although not necessarily on an individual basis for 
small applications) [FT (2004, p. 9)]. 
 
So, the idea was to gradually expand residents and non-residents’ use of (demand for) 
securities rand, probably because restricting non-residents’ supply was not an option 
(that would only have been possible if controls on outflows would be relaxed) so there 
was limited leverage over the ‘supply-side’ of the securities rand market. Table 4.1 
illustrates. 
 
Table 4.1 Proposed Measures to Lower the Discount (Widen the Securities Rand 
Market)*  
Measures designed to decrease 
sources of securities rand  
(supplied by non-residents)  
Measures to increase uses for securities rand↑ (demanded by 
residents and non-residents)  
Non-Residents Residents Non-Residents 
NA Residents’ use of the financial 
market was to be expanded 
gradually and would require 
exchange control approval 
Equity investment  in all real 
(FDI) and financial assets 
(portfolio capital), were all 
recommended as financial rand 
transactions 
* Source: Farrell and Todani (2004). 
 
So, BOP items associated with capital inflows that previously were previously 
channeled through the commercial market (e.g. equity investment in all real and 
financial assets) were now redirected through the financial market. Ceteris paribus, 
one would expect the effects of this measure to be  
 
(i) a weakening of the commercial rand, ↑e , (less demand for commercial rand 
associated with equity investment demand for SA assets)36 
(ii) a strengthening of the securities rand, ↓s , (increased demand for SA assets), thus 
indeed  
(iii) lowering the discount ( )es − . 
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 9), the financial rand system proposed by the 
commission, in its most developed form, did not channel all current transactions 
through the commercial rand market and all capital account transactions through the 
financial market (as would be the case with a simple straightforward two-tier 
exchange rate system).37 The commission recommended, for example, that all loan 
                                                 
35 See also equation (2) and the relevant discussion in the context of the blocked rand system.  
36 Effect (i) looks like an unattractive aspect of the reforms, but was (partly) compensated by the 
proposal to channel loan funds through the commercial market (on which more below).  
37 This is the type of dual exchange rate system that is analyzed by Huizinga (1996). Farrell (2001) 
points out that, whereas the standard DRS is characterized by separate markets for all (resident and 
non-resident) current and capital account transactions, the financial rand system featured a two-tier 
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funds were to be transferred via the commercial market (that is the capital as well as 
the interest payments which would usually have been included in the current account). 
Loan funds here included bank loans, syndicated loans, private and public bond 
issues, debenture issues, mortgages, parent company current accounts and shareholder 
loans.  
 
There were two major reasons for the recommendation that loan funds to be 
transferred through the commercial market.  
 
First, with the financial rand likely to be at a discount to the commercial, it was 
considered ‘unfair’ to expect borrowers to repay at the securities rate existing loans 
originally contracted at the official rate.38 As pointed out by FT (2004), the second 
major reason was that the commission argued that in a period of rapid economic 
growth the commercial exchange rate would ‘need the support of the net inflow of 
loan funds, public and private, that may then be expected’. The underlying reason 
here would seem to be that growth in the South African economy sucks in imports, 
especially of capital goods, which tends to increase the demand for foreign exchange 
and place pressure on the commercial rand exchange rate. If loan funds increase at 
such times, diverting them through the commercial market would therefore increase 
the supply of foreign exchange in this market, offsetting the excess demand for 
foreign currency. Table 4.2 summarizes the proposed features of the financial rand 
system.  
 
Table 4.2 Some Features of the Proposed Financial Rand System  
 Typical two-tier 
exchange rate system 
Proposed financial rand 
system 
Current account 
transactions 1  
Channeled via the 
commercial market 
Channeled via the 
commercial market, 
with the exception of 
interest on loan funds 
Loan funds (interest) Channeled via the 
commercial market 
To be transferred via 
the commercial market 
Direct investment 
 
Equity portfolio 
investment 
Channeled via the 
financial market 
To be transferred via 
the financial market 
Loan funds 
(capital/principal) 
(bank loans, syndicated 
loans, private and public 
bond issues, debenture 
issues, mortgages, parent 
company current accounts 
and shareholder loans) 
Channeled via the 
financial market  
To be transferred via 
the commercial market 
1 Including trade credit. 
 
In addition to the widening of the market, the commission proposed that intervention 
by the Reserve Bank was allowed ‘as part of a co-ordinated policy of intervention in 
                                                                                                                                            
float. It was partial in the sense that it incorporated only a subset of capital account transactions in the 
financial rand foreign exchange market, and it was asymmetrically applied in that free access to this 
market was generally restricted to non-residents (resident access was allowed only in approved cases).  
38 This is of course the issue of subsidizing international lending (subsidizing capital inflows) as 
analyzed under the blocked rand system.  
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the commercial and financial markets’ (para 255-6, quoted by FT). The rationale here 
appears to have been to smooth sharp movements in the rate, although the 
commission anticipated that intervention in the financial rand market would be 
infrequent and of limited magnitude.  
 
The way these interventions can be used as a key aspect of monetary and exchange 
rate policies can be analyzed as before with the relevant arbitrage equation for non-
resident investors (in logs) 
 
12
* ffii −+=                     (15) 
 
This equation corresponds with cases 2 and 3 of Table 2.3 above (where I have 
assumed repatriation via the financial rand along the lines of the regulations of the 
1978 budget.39 
 
Equation (15) is simply equation (8) where we have substituted 1f  for 1b , and 2f for 
2e . Combining equation (15) with equation (9) – which introduced spot market 
intervention – and  
 
fff FLOAT += 11                    (16) 
 
where equation (16) is the financial rand counterpart of equation (12) (with 
f substituted for s )  – which introduced securities market intervention - we get 
 
( ) ( ) ( )221112* efeeffeeii FLOATFLOAT −+−−+−−+=              (15’) 
 
As before for the cases of the blocked- and securities rand systems, equation (15’) can 
be reformulated as a reaction function here governing coordinated spot and financial 
market intervention to bring about (target) a desired value for i . So, we rewrite (15’) 
so that i becomes the policy target di , and e and f the CB’s instruments, this yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221112* efefeeiief FLOATFLOATd −+−−−+−−=−             (17)40 
 
Equation (17) is the central bank’s optimal reaction function governing its optimally 
induced manipulation of the financial rand discount. It indicates that in the presence 
                                                 
39 Under the new arrangments in place from 30 March 1978, the proceeds of government, municipal 
and public utility stocks could only be repatriated on redemption through the securities (financial) rand 
or investid in new 6 percent bonds introduced by the Treasury.  
40 If the central bank were to target the financial rand discount directly at def )( − , say, then its 
optimal coordinated intervention policy according to (9) and (16) would be 
( ) ( ) ( )FLOATFLOATd efefef 11 −−−=−  (16’). It follows that if the CB trades off direct financial 
rand discount  stabilization and engineering a lower domestic rate via a higher discount, its optimal 
intervention policy would be a weighted average of (16’) and (17). Calling the weight on (preference 
for) direct financial rand discount targeting 10 ≤≤ α , then we have 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )dFLOATFLOATd efefefeeiief −+−−+−−−−+−−−=− αααα 221112* 111
(18), which collapses to (16’) ((17)) if α =1 (0). 
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of capital controls and a dual exchange rate system South Africa can decouple its 
interest rate from the international interest rate, i.e. 0* <− ii d , but that this would 
come at the price of a higher financial rand discount.  
 
In the absence of financial market intervention, that is 0=f - the same outcome can 
be achieved, but then at the price of a (most probably) overvalued commercial 
exchange rate effectuated inter alia by spot market intervention ( 0<e ). This loosely 
corresponds with reaction function (10).41 Similarly, in the absence of spot market 
intervention - that is if 0=e  - a similar objective can be achieved by cutting the 
financial rand exchange rate ( 0>f ). This case is related to the reaction function 
implied by arbitrage condition (13).42  
 
It follows that the central bank can also combine spot and forward market intervention 
by doing ‘a bit of both’. That is, it can achieve the same objective with two 
instruments, instead of intervening in just one market. Thus, it can pitch i below *i by 
selling some financial rand to non-residents for dollars (but not as much as in the case 
absent spot market intervention), and then sell the dollars for rand in the official 
(commercial) exchange market (where obviously the SARB would buy less dollars as 
in the case absent financial market intervention so that the commercial exchange rate 
does not appreciate as much).43  
 
4.2 THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM: 
EVALUATION 
 
As is evident from the commission’s proposals the idea was to have managed market 
determined rate for the commercial rand, and a more floating rate for the financial 
rand. This already suggests that the commercial market would be more subject to 
interventions then the financial market. This recommendation made perfect sense, as 
the securities (financial) market was too illuiqid to allow substantial interventions to 
be conducted there in an orderly manner.44 In addition, the commission wanted to 
boost non-resident demand for securities rand, and thereby to affect the fundamental 
imbalance in the securities rand market (an imbalance obviously caused by the 
controls on residents45 and non-residents in the first place), and so hopefully lower the 
securities rand discount which as said before (i) increased the cost of capital for the 
SA economy, and (ii) inhibited new inflows (through the commercial market) thereby 
unintentionally working as a de facto quantity control on net inflows and preventing a 
much-needed boost in foreign exchange reserves. The proposed solution was to 
recommend equity investments (in all real and financial assets) as financial rand 
                                                 
41 There is no exact correspondence as (10) is based on a different arbitrage equation namely, on 
condition (8) instead on condition (15).  
42 The implied raction function is ( ) FLOATd seiis 12* −+−−= . This equation is no precise limiting 
case of (16), as it is based on arbitrage condition  (8) instead of condition (15).  
43 Obviously, the above policy would increase the financial rand discount. 
44 In addition, there was the policy trade-off to perhaps try to engineer a wedge between domestic and 
international interest rates, but this then would be a the price of a most probably overvalued comercial 
exchange rate (a substantial financial rand discount). 
45 Remember that one of the reasons for the persistent discount was a tendency for local buying of SA 
shares (high Jp ) associated with controls on residents that inhibited resident off-shore investments. 
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transactions (thereby stimulating demand for financial rand, and lowering the 
discount). In addition, loan funds were recommended as commercial transactions. The 
intended effect of the latter was to support the commercial rate especially in times of 
rapid economic growth when the SA economy sucked in imports, especially of capital 
goods, which tended to place pressure on the commercial rand exchange rate 
( 0>FLOATe ).46 So, in a way the ‘relabelling’ of loan funds as commercial market 
transactions can be seen as a substitute for commercial market intervention.47  
 
5.1 THE FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM 
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 10), (most of) the recommendations of the De Kock 
commission were accepted by the authorities in January 1979, and the securities rand 
changed into the financial rand. The financial rand system operated initially until 7 
February 1983, when the rand was reunified.  
As was the case with the securities rand, the financial rand generally traded at a 
discount to (was weaker than) the official rate, i.e. ef > .  
 
Remember that the discount captured the perceptions of foreign investors and 
therefore their willingness to leave assets in the country [Farell and Todani (2004, p. 
24)]. Ceteris paribus, the higher (lower) the discount the less (more) willing foreign 
investors are willing to leave assets in South Africa.48 
  
Chart 5.1 plots the level of the (monthly) exchange rates of the financial and 
commercial rand since 1979. Obviously, the vertical distance between the top and 
bottom lines indicates the financial rand discount. 
  
                                                 
46 Remember that FLOATe  would be most likely positively correlated with the current account position 
(for example with variables like the gold price). 
47 With the discount hampering net inflows increases in foreign reserves – that could have been used to 
support the commercial rate in times of stress – were also limited.  
48 However, the discount was not entirely an exogenous variable, as it could be affected by 
(coordinated) intervention in the financial and comercial markets (instead of, or in addition to an 
exchange rate policy that tried to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates). 
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Chart 5.1 The Financial Rand: 1979-83 and 1985-95* 
 
* Source: Farrell and Todani (2004). 
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 11), although the precise regulations pertaining to the 
system were changed form time to time, the basic mechanics of the financial rand 
system remained the same and worked in a similar way as outlined in the Section on 
the blocked rand system. Geographically, the market was located mainly in 
Johannesburg and London, and can be viewed as having operated through two 
channels – the ‘cash’ market and the stock exchanges. In the cash market, a number of 
local banks quoted two-way rates. This is the direct channel as outlined in the first 
two rows of Table 2.1. Alternatively, non-residents could bypass the cash market by 
transacting on the London and Johannesburg stock exchanges. Investors would buy 
South African shares in London with foreign currency, and sell them in Johannesburg 
(so ‘creating’ financial rand). Disinvestment would proceed in the opposite direction. 
This is the indirect channel as outlined in rows 3 and 4 of Table 2.1. 
 
FT (2004, p. 13) explain that arbitrage via stockbrokers (especially in London) 
provided a link between the two channels. Consider the following example adapted 
from FT. Assume as before that the price of de Beers in London was $10 in London, 
and R40 in Johannesburg. The implicit financial rand rate f is then 
L
J
p
p
=R40/$10 = 
R4 per dollar. If however, in Johannesburg the financial rand was quoted as 
R3.8461538 per dollar, say, arbitrageurs (usually in London) would buy de Beers in 
London ($10), sell in Johannesburg (R40), thus creating 40 financial rand at a cost of 
$0.25 each. Selling these in the cash market for $ 0.26 each, the arbitrageur profited 
and affected all three markets. The price of de Beers would rise in London and fall in 
Johannesburg (together increasing the implicit financial rate below R4), and the 
financial rate in the cash market would increase above R3.8461538. Arbitrage 
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therefore ceased when profits were exhausted (taking transaction costs into 
account).49  
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 14), the conventional wisdom regarding the scrapping 
of the financial rand system was that it would not occur when the financial rand 
discount, 11 ef − , say, was high. The reason was that a unified exchange rate which 
settled at a significantly stronger level than the previous financial rand rate, i.e. 
122 fef >= , would provide a large incentive for non-resident capital outflows. Note 
that if this situation were to occur, it would resemble the situation prior to the 1978 
Budget. Then, non-residents could exit the country via the commercial rate with funds 
originally contracted at the blocked (securities) rate. With the financial (securities) 
rand trading at a discount, on repatriation non-residents received an additive subsidy 
( 1/ −= efσ ).50 The same could be the case if controls were scrapped under 
conditions of a large discount; then the relevant subsidy, σ , would be 1/ 21 −ef . 
 
Given this, it is perhaps surprising that when the financial rand system was scrapped 
in February 198351, the financial rand discount was at a relatively high 17 percent [FT 
(2004, p. 14)]. 
 
FT point out that the consensus is now that the (timing of) the 1983-1985 unification 
was a ‘disaster’. The unified rand was of short duration. It was reintroduced on 2 
September 1985, as part of the response of the monetary authorities to South Africa’s 
debt crisis.  
 
This crisis was sparked by political events – notably the (Rubicon) speech to the Natal 
Congress of the ruling National Party on 15 August 1985 by then State President P.W. 
Botha – which induced large scale capital flight out of the country  in the remaining 
weeks of August.52 As a response the Government suspended trading on the JSE and 
the foreign exchanges through to 2 September. Prior to the Rubicon speech events that 
helped building the crisis were the SA government’s declaration of the State of 
Emergency on 20 July 1985, the French government’s announcement of restrictions 
on investment in South Africa and rumours that began circulating that international 
banks would not renew loans to South Africa which were falling due at the end of 
August. In more detail, then, the 1985 crisis was precipitated by the refusal of US 
banks to roll over loans to South Africa. In August, Chase Manhattan Bank made the 
decision to call in all its outstanding loans to South Africa, and the other banks 
followed suit. [FT (2004, pp. 16-18)].53  
 
                                                 
49 FT note that the regulations which prohibited local actors in the financial rand market from taking 
positions, limited their ability to arbitrage severely (they could only perform arbitrage when they could 
match buyers and sellers at a given cash market rate.  
50 See the section on the blocked rand system. 
51 Although controls on non-residents were effectively removed at this time, those on capital transfers 
by residents remained largely in place. The apparatus for registering non-resident ownership of 
securities was also retained.  
52 Prior to the speech an expectation arose that political reforms of the apartheid system would be made 
to appease foreign bankers. This expectation was effectively destroyed in the speech.  
53 Following Feldstein (1999), FT label it as a ‘balance sheet’ or liquidity crisis.  
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As a policy response, on 1 September 1985, an emergency package of measures was 
announced which included a moratorium on debt repayments, and the reintroduction 
of the financial rand system in much the same form as had existed in 1979-1983.  
 
5.2 THE FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM: EVALUATION 
 
As already explained in the context of the blocked rand system, there were serious 
adverse effects of the controls.  
 
Firsly, the financial rand discount drove up the cost of debt finance (the cost of 
capital) for the South African economy.  
 
Because of the discount, if a non-resident wanted to invest in SA assets it would be 
cheaper to transfer dollar funds into rand (i) indirectly, namely to find another non-
resident that wanted to disinvest from the country – who had a supply of financial 
rand that he wanted to sell – rather than (ii) directly, i.e. to buy rand on the official 
foreign exchange (cash) market. However, the investment into South Africa under (i) 
above, say by non-resident # 2, can only proceed if non-resident # 2 – who is ‘in the 
market’ to buy financial rand – can be matched with a seller, say resident # 1, of 
financial rand. This means that the investment in South Africa by non-resident # 2 is 
matched with a disinvestment by non-resident # 1 of a similar amount. Thus, a very 
important effect of the financial rand system was that there could be no net investment 
into South Africa via the financial rand (the closed pool argument)!  
 
Thus, secondly another unintended effect of the controls on outflows was that they 
turned into serious implicit quantity restrictions on net capital inflows. Although the 
controls on outflows protected the foreign reserves from declining, they also limited 
net-capital inflows, which would have boosted those reserves.  
 
However, perhaps the controls had some benefits such as insulating the commercial 
exchange rate from capital account factors.  
 
This is in fact the topic of a recent paper by Farrell (2001). He considers whether the 
imposition of capital controls in South Africa affected the stochastic behaviour of 
foreign exchange rates, and provided insulation to the commercial exchange rate of 
the rand. Farrell models the volatility dynamics of South African exchange rates using 
autoregressive conditional heteroschedastic (ARCH) models, and examines whether 
the financial rand system of capital controls, imposed on non-resident portfolio capital 
outflows in the 1985-95 period, affected the volatility of the commercial rand 
exchange rate. 
 
Two main issues relating to the effectiveness of these controls in achieving this 
objective are considered in his paper. Firstly, if the financial rand system was 
successful in separating current and capital account transactions, then the volatility of 
the commercial rand exchange rate when the controls were in place should be lower 
than in the contiguous periods when the exchange rate was unified. Secondly, an 
implication of successful separation is that shocks specific to the financial rand 
market should not be evident in the commercial rand exchange rate. This suggests that 
in general the dual exchange rates should not exhibit a common volatility process, and 
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that volatility in the financial rand market should not spill over into the commercial 
rand market. 
 
Farrell finds that (i) the volatility of the commercial rand exchange rate was lower in 
the 1985:9-1995:2 period than in the contigious periods 1983:2-1985:8 and 1995:3-
1998:10 when the rand was unified. Thus, Farrell’s first result is that 
 
( ) ( )FLOATCOM eVareVar <                   (19) 
 
where Var denotes the variance (volatility) and COMe ( FLOATe ) is the commercial 
(unified) exchange rate for the 1985:9-1995:2 (1983:2-1985:8/1995:3-1998:10) 
period.54  
 
In addition, he finds that (ii) the financial rate was more volatile than the commercial 
rate, and that volatility in the financial rand did not impact on the commercial rand 
exchange rate (although he did find evidence of volatility spillovers from the 
commercial rand exchange rate to the financial rand). Thus, using f  for the financial 
rand exchange rate and ( )•g  for functional, Farrell’s second result is that 
 
( ) )( fVareVar COM <  and  ( )( )COMeVargfVar =)(                (20) 
 
He uses these results to claim that:  
 
‘The financial rand set of controls was successful in achieving the primary objective of a dual exchange 
rate system, namely that of providing the necessary separation between the dual exchange rate markets. 
Although a no financial rand system counterfactual is virtually impossible to provide, it seems likely 
that the financial rand system insulated the commercial rand exchange rate from volatility in 
non-resident portfolio capital flows in the 1985-95 period’ [Farrell (2001, p. 14), emphasis mine] 
 
Let us now take a closer look at results (i) and (ii).  
 
Ad (i)  
 
Firstly, because of the existence of the exchange controls and the associated DRS 
demand for dollars (and supply of rand) driven by financial factors would not 
materialize on the commercial market. Thus, the official exchange rate of the rand 
was insulated from selling pressures that would have been initiated by non-residents 
selling SA securities, and was therefore most likely to be substantially overvalued 
with respect to the counterfactual (hypothetical) level of the exchange rate in the 
absence of such controls. So, saying that the ‘liberated’ exchange rate was more 
volatile (or weaker) than the ‘chained’ exchange rate is like comparing apartment 
rents in Moscow during and after Communist rule; they can not really be compared 
meaningfully.  
 
Secondly, we know that the presence of capital controls facilitated an exchange rate – 
rather than an interest rate - based monetary policy implemented via heavy-handed 
                                                 
54 Farell and Todani (2004) point out that the volatility of the (financial) rand exchange rate gives some 
indication of the exchange rate risk of investing in South Africa; the higher the variance, say, the 
greater the chance of a large increase (depreciation here). 
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intervention especially in the commercial market.55 This regime was unsuccessfully 
continued in the liberalized environment 1995:3-1998:10 considered by Farrell. It 
continued first in the guise of a de facto nominal dollar peg (1995:3-1996:2), then in 
the form of targeting the real effective exchange rate of the rand (in 1997) both with 
heavy-handed interventions, with disastrous results for exchange rate stability (as is 
evident from the 1996 and 1998 currency crises).  
 
So, the fact that exchange rate volatility is lower in the 1985:9-1995:2 subsample than 
in, say, the 1995:3-1998:10 subsample shows that exchange rate targeting was a lot 
more feasible under a regime with capital controls, than in a liberalized environment 
where it merely helped create currency crises [see also Mishkin (1999)]. Put 
differently, it is somewhat misleading to infer the success of a ‘control regime’ in 
terms of achieving lower exchange rate volatility by using a ‘crisis (high exchange 
rate volatility) regime’ as the benchmark.  
 
Ad (ii)  
 
The fact that Farrell finds that the financial rand was more volatile than the 
commercial rand is plausible, as the financial market was thin56, so not very liquid and 
thus not subject to the same (active) degree of intervention as the commercial 
market.57  
 
We conclude this Section by summarizing the intended and unintended consequences 
of the financial rand system (for ease of exposition some items have been carried over 
from previous tables).  
 
                                                 
55 According to, say, equation (18) (where 0=f , no financial market intervention) so, commercial 
market intervention would be driven by 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )dFLOATFLOATd efefefeeiie −−−−−−+−−−−−= αααα 221112* 111 (21). 
56 FT (2004, pp 19-20) point out that definining financial rand in a narrow way (according to the 
mechanics of Table 2.1) may be misleading. Since the underlying (that is non-resident held) assets 
were easily convertible, it might be wiser to view both financial rand balances and the relevant assets 
as ‘financial rand’. This wider definition is of some importance when attempting to estimate the ‘size’ 
of the financial rand market. Note however, that the wider definition is probably not the relevant one in 
trying to assess the size of the FINRAND market in the context of CB intervention. FT also state that 
the broader definition is helpful in illustrating the ‘closed pool’ argument. Non-resident sales of assets 
are simple the conversion of one form of financial rand (for example, non-resident held quoted shares) 
to another (a financial rand deposit). 
57 In addition, a reason for Farrell’s result that there are volatility spill-overs from the financial to the 
commercial market may be the presence of commercial market intervention that targets (a weighted 
average of) the financial rand discount and the level of domestic interest rates. For example, if 
commercial market interventions are conducted according to (21), then the commercial rate (as the sum 
of interventions and the ‘floating rate’ according to equation (9)) is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dFLOATd efffiie −−−−+−−= 21*1 111 α
α
αα
α
(22), which shows the dependence of 
(the volatility) of the commercial rate 1e on the financial rate
FLOATf1 . In particular, then volatility of 
the financial rate would be transmitted to the commercial rate, and the more so the larger the CB’s 
weight on targeting the domestic nominal interest rate (the lower its weight on financial rand discount 
targeting).  
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Table 5.1 Effects of the Financial Rand System 
Intended Consequences Unintended Consequences 
1. Insulation of the (capital account of the) BOP from 
capital flows. That is, the BOP was protected from 
outflows driven by non-resident selling of SA securities. 
1. The financial and blocked rand accounts adversely 
affected South Africa’s image abroad as an investment 
destination. 
2. Insulation of the commercial market (official) 
exchange rate of the rand from capital flows. That is, the 
commercial rate was prevented to depreciate in line with 
the outflows under 1 above. 
2. Existence of a discount between the financial and 
comercial rand exchange rates. 
3. Providing more effective protection for the foreign 
reserves (insulation of the country’s level of foreign 
exchange reserves from capital flows). That is FX 
reserves were also protected from declining in line with 
1 above. 
3. Because of the discount, a ‘currency premium’ 
emerged which raised the cost of debt for the South 
African economy. 
4. Allowing the authorities to intervene in the securities 
rand market. 
4. Financial rand market was not sufficiently liquid to 
smoothly absorb sizeable interventions. 
5. Relocating trade from offshore (London) parallel 
foreign exchange market to onshore (Johannesburg) 
market 
 
6. Encourage direct foreign interest in local shares 5. Relocation of trade from London to Johannesburg 
did not materialize. Promotion of Johannesburg as a 
‘financial centre’ was ineffective. 
 6. Controls on outflows implied serious implicit 
quantity restrictions on capital inflows that would have 
boosted the country’s foreign exchange reserves (see 
also 7 below). 
7. Increase foreign exchange earnings for South Africa 
through new portfolio investments 
7. Fundamental imbalance between uses of (demand 
for) and sources (supply) of financial rand by non-
residents led to a substantial discount, )( ef − , 
between the financial and the oficial rate. In turn, the 
discount inhibited non-resident investment through the 
oficial market and the associated foreign exchange 
earnings. 
 8. With the financial rand at a discount to the 
commercial, SA borrowers could be in as position 
where they had to repay at the financial rate existing 
loans originally contracted at the official rate. This 
increased the cost of capital for the South African 
economy. 
 9. Potential inventors (non-residents that considered to 
invest in, say, SA equities via the financial rand 
market) found the mechanism to be cumbersome and 
could therefore be discouraged from proceeding 
8. When introduced in 1979, the controls were meant as  
a temporary measure, an intermediate step on the road to 
a unified managed float for the rand. 
10. Unintended very substantial ‘institutional inertia’: 
the DRS lasted (interrupted between 1983 and 1985) 
until March 1995. 
9. Comercial exchange rate volatility was lower under 
the FINRAND regime than under the floating regime of 
1995:3-1998:10 when the rand was unified. However, 
this comparison is not very meaningful because (i) the 
comercial rate during the FINRAND regime was most 
likely overvalued, and (ii) the floating regime was a 
crisis (high volatility) regime, which is flattering for the 
control regime (not a good benchmark for comparison). 
11. The presence of exchange controls on residents 
enabled the SARB to target domestic interest rates via 
FX market interventions in the comercial and financial 
markets. This provides an early rationale for anchoring 
monetary policy via the exchange rate, rather than via 
domestic interest rates. 
 12. The (timing of the) temporary 1983-1985 CAL was 
a disaster. Among other things the (quasi-fiscal) 
aspects of this liberalization entailed handing out 
substantial subsidies to non-resident investors. 
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6.1 MARCH 1995-SEPTEMBER 2001: THE ABOLISHMENT OF 
THE FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM AND FURTHER 
RELAXATION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
 
An early step in the liberalisation process was the (re) abolition of the financial rand 
system, effective from 13 March 1995. So, the first step in the liberalization of the 
capital account was the relaxation of controls on outflows on non-residents. From this 
date onwards non-residents were able to introduce and repatriate funds, and transfer 
current and capital gains, without restriction.  
 
Assuming for ease of exposition that prior to the liberalization non-resident capital 
entered the country through the commercial market and the principal and capital was 
repatriated at the financial rate, the capital account liberalization (CAL) with respect 
to non-residents therefore can be seen as a switch from  arbitrage equation,  
 
( )i
f
f
i +=+ 11
2
1*                (15’)58 
 
to the usual uncovered interest parity relation 
 
( )i
e
ei +=+ 11
2
1*                (23a)59 
 
As indicated earlier the conventional wisdom regarding the scrapping of the financial 
rand system was that it would not occur when the financial rand discount, 11 ef − , say, 
was high.60 The reason was that a unified exchange rate which settled at a 
significantly stronger level than the previous financial rand rate, i.e. 122 fef >= , 
would provide a large incentive for non-resident capital outflows. With the financial 
rand trading at a discount, on repatriation non-residents would receive an additive 
subsidy 1/ 21 −= efσ . When the financial rand system was finally scrapped on 10 
March  1995, the financial rand discount stood at around 8 percent.  
 
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004, p. 24), following the abolition of the 
financial rand, the gradual liberalisation of exchange control has proceeded smoothly 
until the present time. Here we briefly draw upon their survey of the more significant 
relaxations for residential investors, residential corporates and private individuals.61  
 
In July 1995 the so-called asset-swap mechanism was introduced. This mechanism 
enabled resident institutional investors to diversify a portion of their assets abroad. 
Asset swaps were proposed as a means of diversifying portfolios internationally 
without impacting severely on reserves. The mechanism for the South African asset 
                                                 
58 This is the equivalent, in ‘absolute values’ of equation (15) which is in natural logs. 
59 Equation (23a) is the post-FINRAND counterpart of the blocked rand (equations (3), (6), (7) and 
(8)), and of the securities and financial rand arbitrage equations ((11) and (15) respectively).  
60 Additional conditions that according to the SARB needed to be met were (i) a significant increase in 
the country’s net foreign exchange reserves and (ii) a substantial reduction in the stock of financial 
rand denominated deposits in the banking system.  
61 See FT for a survey of the foreign exchange and tax amnesty. 
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swaps involved qualifying institutions putting forward proposals to swap part of their 
existing portfolio’s for the foreign assets of foreign investors, with the proposals 
required to ‘lock in’ the reciprocal foreign investment for a period of 2  
years (i.e. the requirement was that the local institution ensured that the foreign 
counterparty or its replacement/s remained invested in South African securities [FT, 
pp. 24-25)]. 
 
Note that the asset swap mechanism resembles the blocked (securities, financial) rand 
system in that although individual resident investors could invest abroad, the 
mechanism was set up to prevent (severe) net capital outflows (or capital flight). This 
ensured that at the end of the day although the capital controls on residents were 
relaxed, there was still a mechanism in place to prevent residents and non-residents as 
a group from disinvesting from South Africa. Compare this with the blocked 
(securities, financial) rand system, where individual non-resident investors were 
allowed to disinvest from the country, but where non-resident investors as a group 
could not.  
 
With respect to resident companies, FT (2004, p. 28) mention that some progress has 
been made in allowing them to make direct investments abroad, and raise foreign 
funding against their domestic balance sheets. Between 1994 and 1998, these 
amounted to about US$ 10.7 billion. Current (March 2004) limits on approved 
investments are R 2 billion for investment into Africa (including SADC), and R 1 
billion for the rest of the world.  
 
Further, as part of the gradual relaxation of exchange controls, the concept of share 
placements was introduced in the 2001 budget.  Also from 2003 dividends repatriated 
from foreign subsidiaries are eligible for an exchange control credit, which may be 
transferred for approved foreign direct investments.62 Private individuals over 18 
years of age and in good standing with the tax authorities were permitted to make 
limited investments abroad from 1 July 1994. Initially, the limit for offshore holdings 
was R 200 000 per individual. This limit has since been increased on various 
occasions and from 23 February 2000 it has stood at R 750 000 per individual [FT 
(2004, p. 28)]. 
 
6.2 MARCH 1995-SEPTEMBER 2001: THE ABOLISHMENT OF 
THE FINANCIAL RAND SYSTEM AND FURTHER 
RELAXATION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS: EVALUATION  
 
Let us now evaluate the asset swap mechanism in a bit more detail. It is clear that if 
capital controls on residents are fully relaxed then they would diversify assets (based 
purely on return considerations63) by, say, using the following arbitrage equation 
 
                                                 
62 Of course, there are additional exchange control regulations that apply to a sub-set of resident 
companies, for instance those that apply to exporters. Exporters can retain their foreign currency 
proceeds offshore for 30 days and then have an additional 180 days to keep the FX on a customer 
foreign currency (CFC) account with an authorized dealer. 
63 In case investors’ considerations comprise risk as well as return considerations we need a more 
complicated arbitrage equation as (23a) and (23b) are base don risk-neutrality, i.e. domestic and 
foreign assets are assumed to have the same risk.  
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Equation (23b) reflects that 1 unit of domestic currency (rand) can be converted into 
1/1 e  units of foreign currency (U.S. dollar) in period 1, while in period 2 the interest 
and principal returns are repatriated at the period 2 exchange rate, 2e . Note that 
according to this condition –ceteris paribus – resident demand for asset swaps 
increases (decreases) the lower (higher) the domestic rate of return i , the higher 
(lower) the overseas return *i , and the higher (lower) the (expected) rate of 
depreciation of the Rand. Note that this equation was not relevant before July 1995, as 
then residents were prevented from holding foreign assets, so that there was little 
point in doing arbitrage calculations. 
 
However, equation (23b) was not precisely the relevant equation for residents. The 
reason is that the asset swap mechanism only a portion of assets, could be diversified 
abroad), so a better way of analyzing this mechanism is via  
 
( )
1
21*
1 1)1( e
eXiiX +=+   where 111 WyX ≤   and 01 >W             (24) 
 
Equation (24) reflects that a maximum of 1X  units of domestic currency (rand) can be 
converted into 11 / eX units of foreign currency (U.S. dollar) in period 1, while in 
period 2 the interest and principal returns are repatriated at the period 2 exhange rate. 
Here 10 1 << y  denotes the relevant share of total rand assets ( 1W ) that was permitted 
to invest offshore. Of course, if 11 →y  equation (24) collapses to its unconstrained 
counterpart (23b), that would correspond with the case of no capital controls on 
residents whatsoever (where investors are free to up - or downscale their foreign 
investments as they see fit; the only limitation being their level of wealth).  
 
Farrell and Todani (2004, p. 27) point out that although the asset swap mechanism 
addressed a significant problem associated with exchange control, namely the 
inability of South African institutions to diversify their portfolios, and was designed 
to protect reserves, it created a number of problems. A key issue in this regard was the 
compensation required by non-residents for being locked-in and enduring the 
administrative burden of the swap mechanism.  
 
This can be neatly illustrated with the equations above. Suppose that based on return 
considerations a resident investor wants to invest 1 unit of domestic currency (rand) 
abroad. This means that equation (23b) becomes an inequality, and reads 
 
( )
1
2*11
e
e
ii +<+                 (23b’) 
 
This expression indicates that residents want to invest offshore, as they will reap a 
greater return there, then onshore. However, a closer look at (23a) and (23b) reveals 
that these equations are in fact identical, the only difference being that the first is 
formulated from the perspective of non-residents and the second from the viewpoint 
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of residents. This means that if (23b’) holds, indicating that residents want to invest 
offshore - that is not in South Africa – non-residents will be unwilling to invest in 
South Africa as well, as the return profile favours their own region (from his 
perspective onshore), i.e. 
 
( )i
e
ei +>+ 11
2
1*                 (23a’) 
 
So, based on return considerations only, the asset swap mechanism is inherently 
problematic. The point is that there is one and one arbitrage relation only, relevant to 
both resident and non-resident investors. In the version here it is generally impossible 
to get a match, i.e. to lock in the required reciprocal foreign investment matching the 
initial offshore investment of residents. The reason is simple; when residents want to 
invest in the US, say, non-residents (US) investors will be unwilling to invest in South 
Africa and vice versa. This appears to be a serious flaw in the architecture of the asset 
swap mechanism. 
 
Of course, to be more precise, one would have to reason based on (24) instead of 
equations (23a) and (23b), but the argument would be exactly the same. If a resident 
investor wants to invest 111 WyX ≤  rand offshore, guided by  
 
( )
1
21*
1 1)1( e
eXiiX +<+                            (24b) 
 
then, a non-resident investor would want to invest the ‘matching’ dollar amount 
11 / eX in the US (from his perspective onshore), and not in South Africa, preventing a 
match and thereby preventing the asset swap taking place! 
 
Over time the limits that resident investors were allowed to invest offshore have 
gradually increased, i.e. 1y  has increased over time (from 5 percent initially in July 
1995 to 15 percent in November 2001). This suggests that controls on residents have 
gradually been relaxed. However, as indicated with the aid of the simpe example 
above, the question is which of the constraints on outflows is actually binding: the 
asset limit or the reciprocal investment requirement. Iit is clear that in theory 
situations are possible where 11 →y , so all assets are allowed to be invested offshore, 
but where in fact 0 percent will be invested offshore as it is generally difficult to find 
a match. This suggests an important difference between de jure and de facto 
relaxation of capital controls on residents. 
 
Another problem mentioned by Farrell and Todani (2004, p. 27) was the following. 
After the abolition of the financial rand system there were no more controls on non-
residents, so they were completely free to invest wherever they wanted, although of 
course the idea was that they should please invest in South Africa, thereby facilitating 
– inter alia – the realisation of asset swaps that would enable resident institutional 
investors to diversify their portfolios. Now, we have already argued that arbitrage 
equations (23) and (24) jeopardize the realization of asset swaps; based on their 
symmetry there can never be a match! So, starting to think from here one way to 
make the swaps happen (assuming a large resident demand for portfolio 
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diversification) would be to create a wedge between the onshore (South African) 
returns offered to South African and, say, US investors in South Africa.  
 
This can also be illustrated clearly with equations (23b) and (23a). Suppose that non-
resident investors get offered NRi instead of i  (where ii NR > , to ‘lure in’ the foreign 
investment required to realize the asset swap) when they invest in South Africa, so 
that (23a) becomes 
 
( )NRi
e
ei +=+ 11
2
1*                (23a’’) 
 
This implies that residents when they invest onshore realize return ii R < , so that their 
arbitrage equation becomes 
 
( )
1
2*11
e
eii R +<+               (23b’’) 
 
Now, assume that in fact these two equations represent the actual truth; non-resident 
investors are indifferent between investing off- and onshore, while resident investors 
prefer to invest offshore. Then, substituting the indifference relation (23a’’) into 
residents’ arbitrage relation, this then becomes 
 
( ) NRRNRR ii
e
e
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e
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2
2
1 11                             (25) 
 
Equation (25) suggests that residents will invest offshore, and that they will be able to 
do this within the perimeter of an asset swap – which will now be realized - if and 
only if RNR ii > . That is, the asset swap will go ahead if non-residents (foreigners) are 
offered a higher return on South African investments than residents (South Africans) 
on the same investment.   
 
Of course, the swap now goes ahead because the symmetry between (23a’) and (23b’) 
has been broken by the appearance of what we could call a ‘dual’ retun profile on 
onshore investments. Instead of the ‘unified’ return i (applicable to residents and non-
residents equally) which prevents the asset swap to be realized, the high demand for 
resident portfolio diversification has created a parallel market for South African 
investments. Put differently, we know have a dual return system with return Ri  
accrueing to residents and NRi to non-residents. This is presumably what FT (2004, p. 
27) mean when they say that: 
 
‘A danger was therefore that the asset swaps, if popular, would undermine the role of the JSE, with a 
large parallel market emerging, and volumes and prices on the exchange not reflecting the true 
situation’ 
 
Another point to stress is that the difference between the two yields can be interpreted 
as a subsidy RNR ii −=σ per unit of investment handed out to non-residents in return 
for investing in South Africa so as to realize the asset swap. This reminds us of other 
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implicit subsidies in the context of controls on non-residents, namely the blocked- , 
securities-64, and financial rand systems.65  
 
It appears that above subsidies were (part of) the price to be paid for having systems 
in place that protected the official foreign exchange reserves. So, the protection of 
reserves came at a price, it was certainly not for free. Put more broadly, there were 
clearly (ex post) policy trade-offs associated with systems of exchange control (either 
on non-residents, residents, or both). In some cases (blocked and secutities rand 
systems) these controls had important fiscal aspects (apart from unintentionally 
blocking net inflows), in case of the partial (implicit) remaining controls on residents 
via the asset swap mechanism they had the hidden cost of potentially distorting 
pricing on the domestic capital market.66  
 
Note that this informal dual return system is the response of the international financial 
markets to a problem – the inability to realize asset swaps – that was created by the 
specific regulations pertaining to (remaining) capital controls on residents. In this 
sense, we have an extremely important parallel between the (relaxation of) capital 
controls on non-residents, namely the blocked (securities, financial) rand system and 
the asset swap system. Both had the (potentially) unintended consequence of creating 
a parallel market; in the first case a parallel foreign exchange market, in the second 
case a parallel capital (stock and bond) market.  
 
As pointed out by FT (2004, p. 27), despite the problems with respect to the required 
reciprocal investment and distorted capital market pricing, the asset swap mechanism 
achieved some success. By the time the mechanism was scrapped on 21 February 
2001, R 100 billion in asset swaps had been transacted, suggesting fairly significant 
diversification was achieved.67 More recently, in 2003, as an interim step towards 
prudential regulation, institutional investors have been allowed to invest on approval 
up to the foreign asset limits. Table 6.1 summarizes the discussion above. 
 
                                                 
64 Prior to the 1978 Budget, non-residents could exit the country via the commercial rate with funds 
originally contracted at the blocked (securities) rate. More specific, the subsidy for each unit of interest 
and capital invested was equal to 1−ρ , where eb /=ρ  is the blocked (financial) rate discount 
versus the commercial rate. Thus, the blocked and securities rand system subsidized capital inflows, i.e. 
the systems subsidized international lending.  
65 The consensus on the scrapping of the financial rand system was that it would not occur when the 
financial rand discount, 11 ef − , say, was high. The reason was that a unified exchange rate which 
settled at a significantly stronger level than the previous financial rand rate, i.e. 122 fef >= , would 
provide a large incentive for non-resident capital outflows. If this situation were to occur, it would 
resemble the situation prior to the 1978 Budget (see previous footnote), then the relevant subsidy, σ , 
would be 1/ 21 −ef . 
66 Note that pricing on the domestic capital market was also seriously distorted under the blocked-, 
securities and financial rand systems, as the financial rand discount was a direct consequence of a 
locally overvalued capital market brought about – inter alia - by preventing residents from investing 
offshore, thereby artificially inflating prices on the JSE. 
67 Since February 2001, institutional investors have been allowed to acquire foreign portfolio 
investments up to certain limits by way of foreign currency transfers based on a percentage of the 
previous year’s inflow of funds.  
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Table 6.1 Effects of the Abolishment of the Financial Rand System and Further 
Relaxation of Exchange Controls 
Intended Consequences Unintended Consequences 
1. Abolition of the financial rand system entended the 
relaxation of controls on outflows on non-residents. 
From 13 March 1995 non-residents were able to 
introduce and repatriate funds, and transfer current and 
capital gains, without restriction. 
 
2. Gradual relaxation of controls on residents via the 
asset-swap mechanism. This mechanism enabled 
resident institutional investors to diversify a portion of 
their assets abroad, while at the same time preventing 
capital flight, and thus protecting the country’s reserves. 
Although individual resident investors could disinvest 
from South Africa, because of the requirement of 
reciprocal investment, residents and non residents taken 
together as a group could not.  
1. Required reciprocal investment was not always easy 
to find, hence it could prove difficult to realize the 
swap.   
 2. The asset swap mechanism entailed a substantial 
administrative burden.  
 3. If based on return considerations alone, the required 
return profiles of resident and non-resident investors 
makes consistency of those –and thereby securing the 
reverse investment flow (necessary for a swap) very 
difficult.  
 4. Because of point 3. above there could be a 
substantial difference between the de jure (say, 
potential) and de facto (actual) ability to implement 
asset swaps and diversify assets. 
 5. Given large demand for swaps and the problems 
with respect to matching (see 3.) there was the danger 
of the emergence of a parallel capital market (implying 
dual returns), thereby distorting pricing on the 
domestic capital market. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We are now ready to make some final remarks on South Africa’s experience with 
capital controls and the implications they had for monetary and exchange rate 
policies.  
 
Starting with the blocked rand system, the objective was to insulate the capital 
account of the balance of payments from capital outflows, insulate the exchange rate 
of the rand from said outflows, and to provide more effective protection for the 
foreign reserves from capital outflows.  
 
Unintended consequences of the blocked rand system were : (1) the emergence of an 
offshore parallel foreign exchange market, (2) the emergence of a discount between 
the blocked and commercial rand exchange rates, (3) damage of the country’s image 
abroad – at a time when the attachment to fixed exchange rates was striong – because 
the discount might cast suspicion on the maintenance (affected the ‘credibility’) of the 
official exchange rate of the rand, (4) the discount created a ‘currency premium’ 
which raised the cost of debt for the South African economy, (5) perhaps most 
important of all the controls on outflows implied serious implicit quantity restrictions 
on capital inflows that would have boosted the country’s foreign exchange reserves, 
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(7) potential investors (non-residents that considered to invest in, say, SA equities via 
the blocked rand market) found the mechanism to be cumbersome and could therefore 
be discouraged from proceeding, (8) the system ended up subsidizing international 
investors, (9) there was a very substantial degree of institutional inertia; when the 
system was introduced in 1961, the controls were meant as a temporary crisis measure 
and (10) the presence of exchange controls on residents enabled the SARB to target 
domestic interest rates via FX market interventions in the commercial market. This 
provides an early rationale for anchoring monetary policy via the exchange rate, 
rather than via domestic interest rates.  
 
From 2 February 1976 the securites rand system became operational; a system that 
was supposed to ‘repair’ some of the defects (or unintended consequences) of the 
blocked rand system. The objective was to boost overseas interest in the Republic as 
an investment outlet (to encourage direct foreign interest in local shares), and the way 
the authorities wanted to achieve this was by officially recognizing the securities rand 
exchange rate. This had the added advantage of allowing the authorities to intervene 
in the securities rand market. In addition, by official recognition of the parallel market 
it was felt that offshore (London) trade could be redirected to Johannesburg. Further, 
it was hoped that the increased portfolio investrment into South Africa would increase 
the official foreign exchange reserves.   
 
However, here as well there were quite a few unintended consequences: (1) the 
securities rand market was not sufficiently liquid enough to smoothly absorb sizeable 
interventions, (2) the relocation of trade from London to Johannesburg – the 
‘promotion of Johannesburg as a financial centre’ – did not materialize. As before 
there was a large discount between the securities and commercial exchange rates that 
inhibited non-resident investment through the official market and hampered 
increasing foreign exchange earnings, (3) with the securities rand at a discount to the 
commercial, SA borrowers sometimes had to repay at the securities rate existing loans 
originally contracted at the official rate, this increased the cost of capital for the South 
African economy. 
 
In turn the securities rand system transformed into the financial rand system in 
January 1979. The financial rand system was ‘an updated version’ - so to speak - of 
the securities rand system. The envisaged developments were to extend the uses that 
non-residents could make of the securities rand and to support the commercial market 
by designating loan funds as commercial market transactions. In addition to the 
intended consequences already stated in the context of the blocked- and securities 
rand system, the authorities wanted to have a temporary system; it was supposed to be 
an intermediate step on the road to a unified manged float for the rand. Also the 
system was meant to dampen commercial exchange rate variability.  
 
In terms of unintended consequences - in addition to the dismal features this system 
shared with the blocked and securities rand system such as the impossibility to enjoy 
net capital inflows via the financial rand - we can mention that again there was a very 
large degree of ‘institutional inertia’; although meant as a temporary measure the dual 
exchange rate system lasted (interrupted between 1983 and 1985) until March 1995. 
Further, although commercial exchange rate volatility was indeed lower under the 
FINRAND regime than under the floating regime, say, of 1995:3-1998:10, this 
comparison is not very meaningful because (i) the commercial rate was most probably 
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substantially overvalued, and (ii) this floating regime was a crisis (high volatility) 
regime, which is flattering for the control regime (not a good benchmark for 
comparison). 
 
In March 1995 the financial rand was scrapped, and the two exchange rates were 
unified. However, even the capital account liberalization period March 1995-
September 2001 was not without problems (apart from the two serious currency crises 
that were experienced in this period). The idea behind the liberalization was to scrap 
most of the controls on non-residents, who were now able to introduce and repatriate 
funds, and transfer current and capital gains without restriction. The gradual 
relaxation of the controls on residents – especially on resident institutional investors – 
was implemented via the so-called asset-swap mechanism. This mechanism enabled 
resident institutional investors to diversify a portion of their assets abroad, while at the 
same time preventing capital flight, and thus protecting the country’s reserves. To 
paraphrase the financial rand system, although individual resident investors could 
disinvest from South Africa because of the requirement of reciprocal investment, 
residents and non residents taken together as a group could not.  
 
The problems or unintended consequences associated with especially the asset-swap 
mecahism were: (1) the required reciprocal investment was not always easy to find, 
hence it could prove difficult to realize the swap, (2) the asset swap mechanism 
entailed a substantial administrative burden, (3) if based on return considerations 
alone, the required return profiles of resident and non-resident investors makes 
consistency of those –and thereby securing the reverse investment flow (necessary for 
a swap) very difficult, (4) because of point (3) above there could be a substantial 
difference between the de jure (say, potential) and de facto (actual) ability to 
implement asset swaps and diversify assets and (5) given large demand for swaps and 
the problems with respect to matching (see (3)) there was the danger of the emergence 
of a parallel capital market (implying dual returns), thereby distorting pricing on the 
domestic capital market. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the presence of exchange controls on residents and non-
residents dating back as early as 1961, enabled the SARB to target domestic interest 
rates (and or the exchange rate) via FX market interventions in the (commercial) 
foreign exchange market. This provides an early rationale for anchoring SA monetary 
policy via the exchange rate, rather than via domestic interest rates.  
 
This suggests not only that the capital controls themselves exhibited substantial 
institutional inertia, but that this same institutional inertia also applied to the monetary 
policy regime. A plausible reason  for this is that for most of the 20th century in South 
Africa (partial) capital controls and exchange rate based monetary policies were like 
Siamese twins; almost impossible to separate.  
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